

ON MODERN AUTOMATISM.¹

BY FRANCIS WILLIAM NEWMAN.

GR EATLY different as are the two writers whom we have grouped together—Thomas Pennington Kirkman, F.R.S., and Dr. James Martineau—they are allies in a common cause. Mr. Kirkman is generally satisfied if he can hold up his confident adversary to contempt as knowing nothing; for he is Socratic in his irony and in his subtle banter, which is at times uproarious; yet a real earnestness underlies all, even when we cannot be certain what he positively holds. Dr. Martineau, it need hardly be said of one so well known, is everywhere striving to establish truth, and never indulges in humour or Socratic dissimulation. Both are stirred up by the boastful and insolent materialistic science, which assumes to trample out moral responsibility and the very idea of guilt, as well as penitence and religion, as an old woman's fable. It is somewhat arduous to comment on this controversy; yet the attempt shall be made.

'What is Materialism?' it may be asked. Some writers, whom the public call Materialists, resent the title as insulting; though it may be used quite innocently, as merely descriptive. Mr. Kirkman denies matter to exist, or rather insists that we have no proof of its existence: he seems to charge fallacy on the assumption, and mischiefs very difficult to understand. That we may not be thought to be injurious, we must premise that there are two widely different kinds of Materialists, the practical and the theoretic. By the practical is

meant the class of immoral men who prefer the flesh to the spirit, things of sense to things apprehended by the mind; men either sensual, or mercenary, worldly, ambitious, reckless of high thought. It is the evil savour from such characters which makes the theoretic materialist dislike the epithet. Of course it is to be expected that men who desire to indulge baser propensities will gladly shelter themselves under any pretence of philosophy. The evil tendency of a theory must not be overlooked; but we do not here concern ourselves with depraved persons. We speak solely of theoretic materialism, which is notoriously compatible in an individual with pure morals and noble aims, even if in the herd of mankind the theory gravitate towards baseness.

The great majority both of the thoughtless and of the thoughtful have always taken for granted that both Matter and Spirit exist, and that they are very diverse; the one inactive, the other active. Mind and Body are both intimately known to us, and we habitually contrast them. Bodies we call *matter*, and Mind we call *spirit*. Now if any one theoretically resolve all mind into matter, we entitle him a materialist. But a paradox follows. If some one, as Berkeley, resolve matter into spirit, does he not differ from the materialist in nomenclature only? Call both existences matter, or call both spirit; this is but a difference of phraseology, if the theorists believe that the two existences are but one,

¹ *Philosophy without Assumptions*, by Thomas Pennington Kirkman, M.A., F.R.S. Longmans, 1876.

'Modern Materialism:' Two Articles in the *Contemporary Review* of February and March 1876, by the Rev. Dr. James Martineau.

Human Interests, by Samuel Sainsbury. Tinsley Brothers, 1877.

and that each passes into the other. This obvious and simple remark shows that we do not get to the bottom of the controversy by the statement thus far made: there is certainly something beyond, which clears up the paradox. It is this. The Materialist, regarding matter as incapable of initiating action, attributes a like inactivity to spirit, *because* he thinks he can resolve it into matter. Thus he represents us as mere machines, which are acted upon by forces from without; and treats it as delusion, if we suppose that we have any power of choice, such as moralists assume as an axiom; nay, without which all moral epithets are a blunder and a puerility. This is the real sting of materialism. *Automatist* may therefore be a better name than Materialist. When any one from the side of Berkeley resolves matter into spirit, he is sure to reserve a firm distinction of the spirits which have will and choice, from the spiritual existences in which these powers, if latent, are as it were congealed; just, in fact, as we all distinguish the spirit of a man from the spirit of an ox or a tiger, while we do not call the latter material. Thus the theoretic materialism which we regard as offensive and unendurable, is that which represents us as driven by an omnipotent Fate, and helpless slaves of desire. This doctrine fundamentally and evidently lays the axe to the root of morals; and, if it could be made a national faith, would assuredly ruin the generation of children reared under its influence. It is against this monstrosity that the heart of mankind makes its protest, when it nauseates and rejects materialism.

Dr. James Martineau has again and again pointed at the cardinal error of these materialists by the utterance, which is almost an axiom: 'Never will you learn the properties of the higher by observa-

tion of the lower; never will you learn the complex by ever so profound a study of the simple.' The infatuation of reasoners in this respect is truly wonderful. Their credulity seems always fresh. They produce their fallacy as a new discovery which is to evangelise the world. While I am writing, an elegant little book comes to me by the post from (I suppose) a very well-meaning gentleman, a perfect stranger to me, Mr. Samuel Sainsbury; who, writing on *Human Interests*, and meaning to confute atheism (!), assumes that 'every power, mental and physical, every aspiration, . . . has moved in *automatic* sequence:' also, he reasons, 'the *conduct* of the elephant and of the tiger depend on their *structure*;' so therefore does that of man.' This is advanced as novel and instructive, and as the germ of vast social improvement. We must (forsooth) abandon the idea that man has any Will that can initiate action; we must abolish the idea of Guilt; we must train men (in servitude?), as we train dogs and monkeys; then Virtue and Happiness will abound. Such is the doctrine seriously advanced, with touching simplicity and philanthropy. Forethought for the poorer and wise education every one approves—in theory at least; but must we for this degrade them—and ourselves—into automata?

Mankind are so obstinate and stupid, in the opinion of automatists, that they persist in believing that they have power to initiate action—a power which they call Will. Mr. S. Sainsbury chimes in with the old chorus, that to believe in an initiating Will, is to believe in *effects without a cause*. [Mr. Kirkman traces this argument to Dr. Priestley as the originator.] Why! it is precisely these Automatists who do not believe at all in a cause, nor therefore in effects. They believe only in sequences,

and deny all initiation of action, which is the highest idea involved in the word Cause. They pretend to found knowledge on Experience; yet they throw away with scorn the first and universal experience—that which teaches each of us his own existence. We are not long in the world, before each learns by experience, at once, that he is an individual (*Ego*) and that there is a universe outside of him. The *Ego* of each is nothing but a conscious Power and Will. This experience from within gives us the idea of Power; and when we speak of a Cause, we mean a Power. To allege that each *Ego* is itself directly or indirectly a product of Divine Power, is impertinent in this connection; for it is certain that the *Ego* is earlier known to us than any Divine Power. *Logically*, the *Ego* stands first; *logically*, God is derivative, and only after-known. Our first certainties are the *Ego* or Will-Power and a contrasted Universe. The logic which seeks to explode our belief in Will by a complex of later reasoning, is as imbecile as if one were by elaborate geometry to scold down the geometrical axioms. Happily there is not the slightest danger that men pretending to philosophy will ever convince the mass of mankind that they are automata. Since our first certainty is that we have Power and Will, we are much more likely to treat the philosophers as lunatics. Assuredly if the false philosophy infect young people with the idea that they are necessarily slaves of desire, and that self-control is a delusion, they may in limited circles produce deplorable results. The just fear of this sometimes causes in parents and teachers an indignation which the philosopher calls bigotry; much as the scamp who carries lighted combustibles in a room strewed with explosive powder objects to be hooted at. While we deny that

the just animosity of wise fear is to be called Bigotry, we are aware that it is only by solid argument that the periodically renewed mania of Automatism can be repressed.

Mr. Kirkman brings out into full importance the fact that Will-Force is our first certainty, our essential foundation. He also justly lays great stress on the immense distinction between the propositions *I am* and *Thou art*, alleging that his opponents stealthily assume the latter under cover of the former. Each of us knows his own existence directly, but my knowledge of other men's existence is inferential; and the argument by which I infer mind in other men necessarily requires the same assumptions by which we infer mind to be active in the great universe. I see actions which in me would proceed from design; hence I infer design in others: or I see fitnesses which suggest design, and thus infer mind. *Space* is of course learned by us in learning an outer universe. *Time* is learned by conscious memory. As Mr. Kirkman puts it (p. 13), 'I am, and I know that I am, the conscious thinker of a moment ago;' which is modified (p. 14) into 'I am, and I know that I am, in *Time*.'

Space and *Time* being to each the earliest facts of Experience, simultaneously with learning that he exists, Mr. Kirkman, who is a diligent reader of all metaphysics, not excluding Kant, feels that he has a right to deride Kant for asserting that 'Time and Space are, in themselves and out of us, nothing real at all, but only forms of our intuitions' (p. 95). On this Mr. Kirkman comments as follows (p. 96): 'It amounts just to this: "Space is in itself *unreal*, because it is only the *real* defined space of our *real* intuitions.'" With that mortar and shell Kant blew Time and Space out of creation! The philosophers who wear [weave?] these

cobwebs in their brains are welcome to the remark, that I cannot understand it.' To the present writer Mr. Kirkman's declaration that he cannot understand what Kant means by denying that Space and Time are exterior to us, and calling them 'forms of our intuitions,' is an agreeable avowal. To deride Kant when one cannot understand him, demands both perseverance in reading him and no small courage. But Kant is little concerned in our present argument of Automatism; and we may drop him, with his favourite abstractions. Mr. Kirkman discards the doctrine of the Mills that we have an especial *muscular sense*, but insists on an important distinction between our active and our passive consciousness. Thus, if the temperature in which our body is be suddenly changed, we are aware of it: this is passive consciousness. But if we make an effort and are conscious of it, we know that we are putting forth Will-Force. To evade this fact (as Mr. Kirkman thinks, p. 65) Mr. J. S. Mill refers our knowledge of external resistance to our 'muscular sense.' No one, except in upholding a hypothesis, could deny that we have direct experience of Will. Dr. Martineau is in full accord that herein is the nucleus of our contest for morals and for religion against the Automatists.

Dr. Martineau's first essay is on *Atomic Materialism*, or virtually on *Matter*; his second, on *Dynamic Materialism*, or on *Force*. He insists that the scientists whom he is opposing have no right to the terms Force, Power, at all; for their argument wholly avoids the idea, treating of sequences only. They set forth the *Order* of nature, a grand and noble study; which nevertheless, as science, knows only masses and movements, of which it studies the laws—that is, the process and the rules by which they can be defined. It cannot see Force. In-

deed Physical science totally shuts out all consideration of the only forces which we actually know—those of our own minds. Against all direct study of these forces the Materialists scold, using the word *metaphysics* as one of reproach; and undertake to teach us the secrets of the human mind by their materialistic observations. Herbert Spencer studies nervous matter in order to learn about the human will. Dr. Martineau warmly admires physical science, but he deprecates its usurping authority over realms which are not its own; and cordially agrees with Mr. Kirkman, indeed with Sir John Herschel, that only the consciousness of Effort and Will gives us any idea of force. He fearlessly justifies the extension of this principle (an extension natural and perhaps universal in all simple nations) to the great forces of the Universe; and alleges, not only that according to *prima facie* evidence every great force, as that of gravitation, is the act of some High Will, but that no philosophy can improve the theory. With Anaxagoras he maintains that Mind or Spirit is the only known force to animate the world of matter.

Newton did but develop the law of gravitation, i.e. the rule by which you may calculate it: but after him it seems that many must have thought uniformity of action to disprove Mind, and they fell on to the idea of inanimate or blind force imparted, once for all, to matter by the will of the Deity. Perhaps this widely received opinion differs from Dr. Martineau's doctrine of a perpetually acting Divine Will in phraseology only, except that it implies a definite point of time at which the force was imparted to Matter. Men who were trained in the doctrine of the schoolmen, as afterwards Hutcheson and his followers, objected as fatal to the new doctrine of gravitation, that it supposed Matter to act in places where

it is not. The objection is futile, if directed against those who teach that gravitation is a Divine force; but is decisive against one who disavows spiritual energy pervading the universe. In the latter case the monstrosity is ever on the increase, if physical science succeed in blending Gravitation, Repulsion, and Cohesion (at different distances) into the energy of every atom. The cleverness of the atoms in adhering to work in obedience to *arbitrary constants* becomes a just topic of banter. Newton, as a truly religious man, did but bow before the inscrutable mystery of the forces, when he began to discover their law; and this surely is what we must all do. It is not pretended that we *explain* cosmical movements by alleging Divine energy. God is not a 'hypothesis' which we invent to explode mystery—a purpose which Mr. Herbert Spencer very gratuitously imputes to believers in God;—but when we have direct experience of no force but Will, it is natural to ascribe superior forces to a superior Will; and when a thousand phenomena have correspondences which suggest adaptation, mankind believes in a superior Mind which has adapted them—just as each of us believes in the mind of his fellow-man, though he cannot see or touch it. The wisest and most religious of the moderns does not seem to make any improvement or fundamental change in the Hebrew and Greek idea of a Spirit everywhere pervading the brute masses which we call Matter, so long as we confine ourselves to cosmical phenomena and cosmical theory, as distinct from personal religion.

But Mr. Kirkman is so eager in his attack on Matter, that some notice of it ought here to be taken. With deference to so wide a reader and so acute a man, the opinion shall be ventured that he wastes his force, and does not understand the posture of mind which insists on a

belief in Matter. When Plato desired to inculcate the belief of abstractions in no conjunction with things concrete; or, as the Greeks put a single case, to believe in Whiteness though nothing were White; Aristotle advanced as a refutation, what he regarded as certain fact, that whatever has Whiteness has necessarily other qualities beside Whiteness. We in preference may state the objection to Plato thus: We cannot even imagine Adjectives except in connection with Substantives, nor understand an Abstract noun except as expressing the property of a Concrete noun. Thus if we hear talk of Force, Power, Potency (words really equivalent), it implies something that is Forcible, Powerful, Potent. It is in some sense a fraud of the English language, to convert abstract into concrete by superadding the article A, An. Thus it has been ingeniously observed, that an English boy is apt to translate 'This is a serious consideration, into the Latin 'Hæc est seria consideratio,' instead of 'Hoc est serio considerandum.' From inobservance of the indefinite article he unawares passes from the concrete to the abstract, and makes absurd Latin, though both the separate words and the syntax are correct. Just so, when a mathematician passes from Force to 'A force,' he persuades himself perhaps that he makes no change, and fancies that Force stands alone and unsupported in 'A force.' Force is abstract, and can only exist in something that is Forcible; what the something is, we perhaps neither know nor care; but we call it Matter. 'A force' can mean nothing but 'A something forcible;' we cannot get rid of the concrete. To speak for others is arduous; but the present writer can confidently avow for himself that he is totally unable to imagine an abstract without a concrete. Wisdom, Power, Virtue, if no Wise,

Powerful, Virtuous persons are imagined, are empty, idle, terms. Mr. Kirkman does not merely taunt his opponent with inability to 'find' matter—which might be a mere form of exposing want of proof on the part of men who talk high of demonstration—but he seems to discern some lurking evil, some germ of atheism, in believing matter to exist; though it does not appear to have any such tendency in Dr. Martineau, who is not deficient in sensitiveness on this head. But besides, Mr. Kirkman does not see the difficulty, not to say impossibility, of conceiving Motion in a Force which is defined by two things—Geometrical position of its centre, and Force directed towards or from that centre. For we cannot recognise any identity in it when the geometrical centre is changed. If two material atoms A, B, animated by certain forces, exchange places, we can still recognise the identity of A when its centre is found where that of B was; and conversely. But if the atoms (so called) have no matter at all, and the force exerted is not the same force in successive times, but only force guided by an unchanging law (a supposition which we cannot avoid), there is no continuous identity, and the idea of motion vanishes. A mathematician dealing with this subject of course finds nothing in mere matter to calculate from, except its *mass* or amount. How Mr. Kirkman gets rid of this is not at all clear. He alleges, indeed, that the resistance to motion experienced when we try to push a weight along a horizontal table is due *solely* to friction. No doubt it is due *chiefly* to friction; but if friction could be totally removed, a greater mass would require greater force to move it. We cannot get rid of the *inertia*, which the common mind regards as the characteristic of Matter. *Inertia* surely cannot be resolved into Force. It seems therefore regrettable, that

Mr. Kirkman has so launched out on this topic.

Dr. Martineau, arguing against Mr. Kirkman's opponents, employs substantially the same arguments as are here used against Mr. Kirkman. He calls such doctrine 'dynamic idealism,' and while admitting that the theory is convenient for mathematical physics, rejects it as philosophically untenable;—because, first, an atom must exist *per se* if it is to be invested with power; next, the conception of motion is not provided for, if there be no entity to move. Attraction, Repulsion, Motion, present to us words that arouse no thought, if there be nothing that attracts, repels, moves.

Dr. Martineau lays more stress than the Theistic argument requires, on the fact that his opponents have not been able to complete their imaginary construction of the universe from homogeneous molecules. Classical readers will remember that Lucretius needed angular and hooked atoms as well as round ones for his theory. Modern chemistry is far enough off from the simplicity towards which every man of science is bound to strive. But since it would be surely no triumph to Atheism, no defeat of Theism, if science were to succeed in dispensing with heterogeneous molecules, such argument is to be deprecated as would suggest a shout of triumph from the Atheists every time that a new step forward towards a simpler theory was made. Dr. Martineau is too profoundly convinced that Metaphysics and Religion are outside the domain and potency of physical science, to have the smallest jealousy of its real advance. Few practical ministers of religion have studied physics more eagerly than he, or more admiringly.

His two essays were elicited by an attack made by Professor Tyndall on a lecture which he delivered to theological students. This lec-

ture was directed against thoroughgoing materialists, not against Professor Tyndall; whose ambiguous position and manifest inconsistency were deplored by the real materialists, while Theists rejoiced that he refused to go all lengths against the foundations of religion. In attributing *life* to matter, he really renounced materialism. For this reason Mr. Kirkman might have spared or softened some of his severity. Professor Tyndall, supposing himself the object of Dr. Martineau's attack, unwisely responded in a way that laid him open to very effective reply. On his own ground of Physics he is so highly esteemed, that he had been tempted to think he was equally competent to lay down the law in Metaphysics. Yet there is abundant proof in the history of even mathematical science, how very difficult is its metaphysical side, and that mere mathematical power does not at all imply a high ability to go back to real first principles. However, in any case we may rejoice that these two essays, so instructive and so forcible, have been drawn out from Dr. Martineau. It is to be hoped that they will be published in a separate volume. His definition of CAUSE is very notable, as 'that which changes the undetermined into the determinate.' In every act of Will we see this clearly; as when we deliberate which hand we shall raise, and settle the doubt by raising the left hand rather than the right. This does but show out visibly the nature of Moral Choice. That which Automatists are pleased to call 'Effect without a Cause,' is, on the contrary, the acting of a real cause, the *only* cause directly known to us—the human Will.

On the objections to Free Will which some extreme Calvinists make, a few words may be here in place. They tell us that God is the sole cause; that His will is necessarily always done, even when we sin against Him (a difficult combina-

tion of thought); that a sinner has an enslaved will, not a free will. Moreover, those who do not take up quite so hardy a theory, yet insist that our actions, being foreseen by the Deity, cannot possibly be free. If any part of them were indeterminate, He could not foresee them. Foresight implies that they are already determined.—To this it might be sufficient to reply, that if the thing not yet determined at one o'clock becomes determinate at two o'clock, we do not change the state of things at either date by supposing a Divine mind which can behold, as from a distance, each stage of the process simultaneously. But if any one cannot understand this reply, or insist on dogmatising about God as the sole cause (an argument which, if harshly pressed, annihilates human responsibility, and, wholly crushing the basis of morals and of religion, of course leaves nothing for Calvinism), he drives us to insist that we know more about ourselves than about the Divine power or the Divine knowledge; that our first and most certain knowledge is our possession of POWER TO CHOOSE; on which morality is built: therefore any religion which can anyhow make pretensions must concede this before it deserves reception. Fundamental truth must not be renounced to please a preacher of religion, any more than to please an Atheist.

Mr. Kirkman concerning the Will attacks Herbert Spencer, and concerning Causation makes J. Stuart Mill his target. It is deplorable that a man who has talents so high for Physics as Mr. Spencer, should have a monomania for exploding all the first and most certain knowledge of every human being by arguments spun out to great length; arguments to which one has always this reply, that the conclusion is contrary to fact and common sense. But as this mania is at least thirty years old, it is probably incurable. Mr. Kirkman selects for

his protest a long passage from the *Psychology*, § 219, in which Mr. Spencer maintains that our Ego or Conscious Self is merely 'a group of *psychical* states constituting an impulse,' and that this, which he calls our *psychical* Self at the moment, is distinct from our *physical* Self; and that the *psychical* states alone determine action. Mr. Kirkman is at the pains of commenting minutely on a long tissue of unproved dogmatism, or, as he calls it, 'unscientific pudding.'

Apparently Mr. Spencer asserts that the Body is our permanent *physical* Self, which of course is passive, and that what is commonly called the Soul, or by him the *psychical* Self, changes from moment to moment, and is nothing but a fleeting group of 'psychical states' which (now and then) 'constitute an impulse.' If so, he is maintaining that his Soul has no coherence or identity in successive times; that it is an 'illusion' to suppose that the Soul is the Ego; thus nothing but the Body is Herbert Spencer. Does he suppose that the use of Greek words, physical, psychical, strengthen his argument? Perhaps they conveniently throw dust into some people's eyes, and sound very grand and wise. Yet it is hard to imagine the intellect which could accept such statements. It may be fair to quote Mr. Spencer's initial assertion against the freedom of the Will. He says, § 219: 'That every one is at liberty to do what he desires to do (supposing there are no external hindrances) all admit: though *people of confused ideas* commonly suppose this to be the thing denied'—by those who with Mr. Spencer deny freedom of the Will. Observe the insolence with which he commences his argument. He cannot think he refutes his opponents (who are the human race) by selecting from them *those of confused ideas* as alone deserving to be confuted; evidently, therefore, he accounts them *all* to be 'people of

confused ideas.' And concerning them he begins by a most gratuitous imputation—as though such a man as Dr. Martineau supposed J. S. Mill and Herbert Spencer to deny that when a man desires a thing attainable, he has freedom of will to do it! For myself I can say, such an interpretation of their doctrine never came into my head. He proceeds to assert: 'But that *every one is at liberty to desire or not to desire* (which is the REAL proposition involved in the dogma of Free Will) is negatived, &c. . . . But again he is totally wrong as to fact. Who ever imagined that at Will we can desire agony? *Desire* has no proper and necessary place in the argument. We do not claim Freedom to *desire*, but Freedom to *act*. I have no desire to put my left foot forward rather than my right, nor my right rather than my left. Which I shall put before the other, is a future event wholly indeterminate; when suddenly, by an act of Free Will, I determine which. *Desire may* be implicated, but is an accident of the affair, unless the word *Desire* be illegitimately extended to include every active principle. Such extension of terms is the grand organ of confusion with this whole school; as Epicureans call eagerness to solve a mathematical problem 'desire of pleasure.' But when two desires contend in the mind—as the desire of solving a problem and the desire of rest—we (the 'men of confused ideas') say, that the Will decides *which* desire shall prevail; *which* impulse shall be more potent. Mr. Herbert Spencer alleges that we have no such power of decision; and thinks to disprove it by denying the identity of the human soul from one hour to another, assuming (it would seem) that desires have a fixed unalterable force, over which the man has no control. This is the nucleus of practical immorality, and a fundamental subversion of all responsibility for action. Against

this folly and perversity collective humanity votes, not one nation or tribe going with the Automatists.

In the attempt to expel all idea of Force from the word Cause, Mr. J. S. Mill has in the last forty years been pre-eminent. But Dr. Brown the metaphysician was the leader, at least in this island. More than fifty years ago Oxford heard this voice from distant Edinburgh: A Cause *means* only an Antecedent!! The reply came at once from many mouths: 'We grant that in physical mathematics Antecedents alone can appear in the argument; yet when we say, the rays of the Sun *cause* heat, we mean more than that they *precede* heat; we mean that they are *efficacious* of heat; and if you reply that we *ought* not to mean this, you have to prove that we are wrong, and not merely assert that we mean nothing more, which we deny.' The argument remains just the same to this day. If Professor Clifford and others choose to extirpate the word Cause from physical researches, they may gain as much perhaps as those who decline to call the Sun fiery or luminous, substituting for these epithets 'a focus of radiation.' But no such change of phraseology in physical science can have any logical weight to unteach us the reality of causation, so long as we are conscious of being men who have freedom to act, and not being helpless machines, the sport of forces external to Self.

Some of Mr. Kirkman's comments on J. S. Mill in the question of Causes, deserve to be here reproduced, § 142, p. 231.

I protest against the employment of two words to express the sense which essentially belongs to one. An *efficient cause** is a silly tautology; because an *inefficient cause*, which is a true cause, is a contradiction in terms. The distinction between *efficient*

causes and *physical causes*, of which Mr. J. S. Mill finds it convenient to avail himself, is unscientific and misleading. In fact, there are no physical causes known to accurate science which are not efficient.' § 143. In § 2 (of Mill's *Logic*) we read: 'The notion of Cause being the root of the whole theory of Induction, it is indispensable that this idea should at the very outset of our enquiry be, with the utmost practical degree of precision, fixed and determined.' Again: 'I premise then, that when I speak of the Cause of any phenomenon, I do *not* mean a Cause which is not itself a phenomenon.'* 'The only notion of a cause which the theory of Induction requires, is *such a notion as can be gained from experience.*' That is, I fancy, if any man in Mr. Mill's company had desired to find a cause for the manifestation of seeming intelligence and will presented by him, he was forbidden by the theory of induction to assign as cause a *conscious mind* in Mr. Mill; for that is no phenomenon, nor can the notion of consciousness *not my own* be gained by experience. Again: 'The invariable antecedent is termed the Cause; the invariable consequent the Effect.' Had Mr. Mill never heard of the force of gravitation, which is nowhere either a *phenomenon* nor an *antecedent* to the phenomenal effect, whether that effect be motion or repose? What right has Mr. Mill to define the invariable antecedent as the cause? Cause is a term that science cannot spare and cannot replace. The Science of the finite cannot hope to go deeper in nature than to find the cause, the requisite and sufficient condition. She is content if she can accurately assign the force or sum of forces in Time, Space, and Number, to which the phenomena are due. For this great study she must have the use of the terms Cause and Causes, which stand neither for antecedents nor for phenomena. From the jewelled zone of venerable Philosophy Mr. Mill filches the most precious of her seals, that grand old gem, the Cause. This was deliberate philosophical felony, not indeed for vulgar lust or greed, but for scientific imposture. Enormous mischief has been done, and is now doing, by the sophistries of Mr. Mill and his school. The efforts which sham philosophy has made to degrade such terms as Cause and Will and Power and Law have been, among the young and half-learned, but too successful; and after the publication of Mill's *Three Essays on Religion*, which are just as well meant and well reasoned as this bungling

* Did not the tautology arise in contrast to the wrongful scholastic phrase, *Final Cause*? Bentham insisted that the latter absurd expression ought to be replaced by *The End in View*: *qy.* The Purpose? the Design?

* This is a guarded protest against calling God the cause of anything.

chapter on Causation, one can have no delicacy in assigning the true aim of this disgraceful word-robbing. It was, to root out of logic and science the notion of a veritable Cause of the Cosmos, and it has culminated in the outpouring of scorn upon the belief of a conscious Author and Up-holder of the Universe, the all-perfect God and Father of us all, which stains the morbid pages of these three essays.

Mr. Kirkman does not call the chapter on Causation *bungling* without adding his proof, § 146. Mr. J. S. Mill is struggling to get rid of Dr. Reid's objection, that if a Cause means merely an Antecedent, Night is the cause of Day, and Day of Night. Mr. Mill has defined the law of Causation to be 'the truth that invariability of succession is found by *observation* to obtain between every fact in nature, and some other fact which has preceded it.' This distinctly applies to Day and Night, Night and Day; yet, in order to wriggle out of his dilemma, Mr. Mill says: 'When we define the cause of a thing to be the antecedent which it invariably follows, we do not use the phrase as exactly synonymous with the antecedent which it has invariably followed *in our past experience*.' Thus he renounces Experience, and the 'observation' insisted on in his definition! Common sense confuted him, and he had not honesty to confess it, but gives a new definition fourteen pages later: 'We may define the Cause of a phenomenon to be the antecedent or the concurrence of antecedents on which it is *invariably* and *unconditionally* conse-

quent; or, instead of *unconditionally*, we may say, subject to no other than negative conditions.' 'A choice is offered us in the definition (says Mr. Kirkman) with embarrassing liberality;' and lest we be puzzled about negative conditions, Mr. Mill further adds: 'The negative conditions of any phenomenon, a special enumeration of which would generally be rather prolix, may be all summed up under one head, namely, the absence of preventing or counteracting Causes.' Thus Mr. Mill, undertaking to define Cause, has to use the word Causes in his definition! 'The Cause of a phenomenon is the antecedent or concurrence of antecedents on which it is consequent invariably, and subject only to the absence of preventing or counteracting Causes.' How very lucid, from a philosopher who is undertaking to set all the world right in their blunders about Causation and Free Will! After all, this definition clearly makes out Night to be the Cause of Day, until counteracting Causes can be alleged.

Mr. Kirkman is justified in high ridicule of this triumphant Logic. He avows that, after this, Mr. Mill might boast,

Jamque opus exegi, quod non Jovis ira ne ignes,
Nec poterit ferrum nec edax abolere vetustas.

The lesson to us is, that the ablest man only makes himself absurd, when he espouses a thoroughly bad and rotten cause, against the general sense of mankind.

NOTE ON THE ARTICLE IN THE APRIL NUMBER CONCERNING
LIQUOR LICENSING.

BY THE WRITER.

A COPY of Mr. Joseph Cowen's Bill for Licensing Boards has been sent to me, and in it I cannot find definite mention of compensating publicans or others when licenses are not renewed. Mr. Cowen, in a published paper foreshadowing his Bill, avowed that such compensation was a lamentable necessity. (I write by memory.) Thus I wrongfully concluded that a scheme for compensation would enter his Bill. I shall be glad to be quite sure that it does not, and am sorry to have made a statement erroneous or doubtful.