

# FRASER'S MAGAZINE.

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## ENGLISH POLICY IN EUROPE.

FOR full thirteen years England has had more to hope or fear from foreign events and from her own foreign policy, than from any of those measures which habitually divide the parties of Parliament. We do not undervalue the importance of the great social questions which are ever obtruding themselves on the magistrate and on the philanthropist,—the relations between workmen and employers, between tenants and landlords, between the individual workmen towards one another, and the demoralizing influences of excessive sensual temptation. Nor would we on any account overlook the immense result of good or evil which must issue to ourselves from our Indian policy; indeed, in many respects this branch of politics may well be called foreign. But to treat any of these questions wisely by legislation, neither the public nor the Parliament nor the Cabinets are ripe, except so far as to support steadily the undeniable rights of man against man in social relations. And it is not to these questions that either faction of politics turns with complacency while Parliament is sitting. In the vacation one or other statesman may toy with philanthropy: it pleases many, and irritates none: but the matters which call out the energy of visible struggle are those which by traditional routine constitute rallying cries for Whig or Tory; and these neither interest philanthropy at home, nor direct policy abroad.

On the other hand, the results to England from the establishment over Europe of freedom on the one hand or despotism on the other, must be enormous. By daily con-

tact with despotism our own statesmen are enslaved, and more or less corrupted. With perpetually increasing intercourse European nations tend to common principles and common practice. If the Continent cannot be elevated to our level of law and freedom, we shall be depressed to their level. The violent overthrow of liberty there tends to sap the foundation of our liberties; and with crude despotism abroad comes restriction of movement, of trade, of education, of printing; in short, everything to cripple material or moral well-being, not on the Continent only, but in all who have close relations with the Continent. Moreover, our position is made at once more glorious and more dangerous by our old liberties, our free press, and our hereditary maintenance of the right of asylum. In 1850 we heard the muttered threats of the Eastern despots on these very grounds. Neither Belgium nor Switzerland were then safe places of refuge for eminent exiles against imperial anger; much less did their press venture to criticise freely the right and wrong of imperial doings. If on the Continent an irresponsible imperialism is to prevail, England must remain permanently armed in time of peace in order barely to maintain her own hereditary liberties. Things might easily have been far worse. Russia and Austria might have gladly welcomed the Prince President of France after his *coup-d'état* of December, 1851, when he sought admission (according to current belief) into the old royalties of Europe, and was coquetting for a Russo-Prussian bride. In that case we should have seen and felt Russia, Ger-

many, and France in hostile union against us, Austria being at that time visibly a mere satrapy of Russia, not daring to encounter her displeasure. We are already in threefold armour avowedly because of the military successes of France, a power professing friendship to us. With what a weight of military and naval armament should we have been worn down, if, in the interests of despotism, Russia and France had combined against us in 1852! Constantinople would then have fallen into the hands of Russia, for the Turkish fleet could not resist unaided. Our fleet on the Mediterranean would have been permanently doubled. Greece might have thrown herself into the arms of Russia, and England must have looked across the Atlantic for allies, if she desired to maintain the luxuries of free press and safe asylum. If we have been saved from these dangers, it is not by the wisdom of our statesmen, but by the folly of the Russian policy. In fact, since 1849, events have shown that there is a profound and momentous contrast of sentiment in regard to foreign policy, between the nation at large and the two parliamentary coteries which wield the national force; and it may seem that the instinct of party prompts the statesmen on both sides studiously to avoid eliciting the sympathies of the nation, lest its enthusiasm overpower them both. On this account they shroud their doings in secret diplomacy, and generally evade publication until the crisis is past; and if of late things have improved in this respect, it is due chiefly to the very different practice followed first in Paris, next in Turin.

It is perhaps correct to say, that the English nation took no *practical* interest at all in foreign affairs from 1815 to 1849. Even in 1848, the June insurrection in Paris so damped the general interest felt in

England for foreign liberty,—so confounded and darkened the prospect,—that it needed the gallant resistance of Sicily and Northern Italy, the revolution of Rome, and the successes of Hungary, before the English nation would rouse itself to inquire into the facts and the justice of the causes. Then at length, in 1849, the numerous and spontaneous meetings in all parts of the country in sympathy with the freedom of Hungary, showed without mistake what was the instinct of England and what its ground of judgment. It saw a *right* and a *wrong*: a constitutional legal nation assailed by its own dynasty; taken unawares while its trained armies were abroad; attacked on all sides, yet speedily victorious; and *after* its righteous and glorious victory, about to be *again* attacked by the whole force of Russia, because it had vindicated its laws against murder, incendiarism, and treacherous invasion. At this the righteous instinct of England was horrified. It did not suspect that the Cabinet in which so pure a Whig as Lord John Russell was Premier, and so great a talker for freedom as Lord Palmerston was Foreign Secretary, could possibly sympathize with the lawless Austrian dynasty. It therefore addressed earnest and trustful petitions to the ministers who were supposed to be friends of freedom. Lord Palmerston's 'Hungarian speech' in Parliament (so it was called) drew out the thankful joy of the Liberal members, who in grateful recognition presented to Lady Palmerston a portrait of her noble husband.

Very few then knew the half-hearted game which the Russell Ministry was playing in Italy, to the ruin of freedom; talking for liberty, winning the confidence and raising the hopes of the people everywhere, yet advising the princes\* against war with Austria,

\* In April, 1849, Ferdinand of Naples felt it necessary to yield to the popular feeling, and pretend to co-operate with Charles Albert against Austria; but the British minister in Naples strongly remonstrated, reminding him of the *integrity of territories guaranteed by treaties and belonging to a power friendly to Great Britain.*

which the people knew to be the only possible means of establishing freedom. Recent events demonstrate how entirely right was the judgment of Italy, how absurd and pernicious was the English policy. By assuming the place of arbitrator in Sicily, our Government damped the popular enthusiasm, which thought its cause safe in English hands; then, having gained time for the King of Naples, allowed him to bombard Messina under the eyes of our fleet, which the Sicilians had never imagined was sent there for the mere pleasure of looking on at the hideous game. The English nation as little guessed that Lord Palmerston had given a distinct sanction\* to the Prince President of France to restore the Pope 'under an improved government.' Nor did it then know that the same lord had repelled Kossuth's envoy, had referred him to the Austrian ambassador, had uttered the (diplomatically false) statement that England knew nothing of Hungary but as a province of the Austrian Empire, and had refused to Hungary that mediation which Queen Anne's Tory Government had forced upon Austria in 1709-11, so establishing the peace of Satmar, which Austria flagrantly broke in 1848. Naturally therefore that could not be guessed which appeared at length when the Blue Book of Hungary was published; that Lord Palmerston, however condemning the folly of Austria, who by quarrel with Hungary 'crushed her own right arm,' still wished that that right arm should be crushed rather than that Europe should lose the precious advantage of 'a strong Austria.' But in the midst of these events a painful revelation was made of the tone of Lord John Russell's sentiment toward the Garibaldians who had defended Rome against the attack of Louis Napoleon. A small ship laden with exiles of both sexes escaped

from Rome to Malta, and were forbidden by the governor to land—a prohibition which might have involved starvation, fever, or shipwreck, when it was hard to know what coasts were then safe for exiles. In reply to Mr. Hume's inquiry in Parliament, Lord John Russell defended the conduct of the Maltese governor, on the ground that 'these people, who had made a revolution at Rome, would no doubt be equally willing, if they could, to make a revolution in Malta.' Who can measure the depth of prejudice implied in such a reply?

The magnitude of the chasm which here divides the nation from the professional statesmen was not fully gauged until Kossuth's arrival in England, the phenomena of which remain to us as a formidable instruction. The whole of the wealthy middle classes unconnected with political office, as well as the lower classes, rallied to Kossuth with a unanimity and spontaneity quite unparalleled, displaying towards him an enthusiasm such as domestic royalty can but rarely command. The greatest and wealthiest cities of the land vied to do him honour; the city of London banquetted him in the Guildhall; Birmingham and Manchester gave him splendid receptions; a host of commercial towns sued for the honour of welcoming him; Edinburgh and Glasgow have always been enthusiastic for him, though time then forbade his going thither. Except the organs of the Stock Exchange (whose cue, we suppose, was to uphold at all events the rotten Austrian finance), the whole liberal press of the country was with him. But in the midst of all this truly national enthusiasm, we should gladly hear that so many as three peers or one privy counsellor breathed publicly a word of sympathy with Hungarian liberties unjustly overthrown. The greatest of all the

\* A later despatch qualifies this by the declaration that Lord Palmerston had not contemplated the use of force in the restoration of the Pope! In other words, he had assumed that the Romans would not fight. He was not shocked at reimposing the Pope, but at reimposing him with bloodshed, which causes scandal.

Whigs—the late Lord Macaulay—in a public address the next year, deliberately avowed that the terrible reaction of imperial violences was only the price paid for the *saving of civilization*. He seems to have confounded Buda-Pesth with Paris.

We can now see clearly wherein the logic of the nation differs from the logic of those who are, or seek to be, its leaders. The nation believes that nations, like individuals, have rights, and that rights are inviolable—that to do the right is the way to the truly expedient; but the statesmen believe that all national rights are to be judged of by expediency, and that by seeking to do that which is expedient we shall do that which is right. The moral contrast of these two states of mind is immeasurable, and, even when neither is carried to its legitimate extent, is vast. Let us dwell a little on the topic.

The politicians tell us that we must wait for the millennium for nations to act on the right and the wrong; that this is all very well for private life, but will not do for public conduct; that it is mere fanaticism to talk against military operations or against a *coup-d'état* as against murder and robbery; that a deed *becomes* right by being very expedient—that is, by concurring to the interests of a great majority: hence, that we can only judge what is right by inquiring what is expedient. Thus, to overthrow a tyranny in Naples and change the dynasty may be right, because a strong Italy is important to Europe; but to overthrow an equally wicked tyranny in Hungary may be wrong, just because Europe wants also a strong Austria.

Those who maintain such paradoxes are often fluent debaters, and as such are difficult to answer; especially as they carry us into the very depths of moral theory by the immensity of their scepticism. Let us here satisfy ourselves by inquiring which of the two was practically wiser, judged of by the result? the instinct of the British nation, which cursed the wickedness of Austria and wished to up-

hold the *rights* of Hungary; or, the subtle cleverness of the British statesman, who, lamenting the violence of Austria, still desired that violence to prosper, for the sake of European *expediency*! The nation did not trouble its head to ask, 'What is to become of Europe if justice is done against Austria?' for it was too simple to imagine that the stability of Europe could depend on injustice to a great country. It was satisfied with the rule, 'Be just, and fear not.' The statesman, anxious for a 'strong Austria' as a bulwark against Russia, deliberately allowed Russia to throw down the bulwark, and convert Austria into her humble dependency. Neither side among us then foresaw the Russian war against Turkey; though it might have been foreseen; for Kossuth in America twice publicly and vehemently foretold it, in March and May, 1852. But no one can now doubt that that war was a natural result of the Emperor Nicholas's conviction that Austria was thenceforth his humble servant, or as he frankly said to Sir Hamilton Seymour, 'What pleases me, pleases Austria.' The Russian war, in dread of which our statesmen sacrificed Hungary, was brought upon them by precisely this very measure. The nation did not look to futurity; yet by confining its view to the simple question of just and unjust, right and wrong, attained the wisdom which the far-seeing statesman missed.

Here is a practical answer to the very gratuitous assertion, that nations will not act on the arguments of right and wrong until the millennium. Far more plausibly might it be said, that they will not act on arguments of philosophic expediency until the millennium. Nothing can be clearer than that the masses of mankind are deeply acted on by two sorts of motive; first, by personal material advantage (such as no one will dare to call expediency in that high and noble sense which embraces the interests of all others as well as our own); secondly, by a concep-

tion or perception of right and wrong. The impulses of a multitude may, on the one hand, be quite as base and much coarser than those of the most unscrupulous tool of tyranny; on the other hand, their impulses are often generous, and, in proportion to their knowledge, aim at justice. But what is quite impossible for a nation is, to estimate justice *by means of* arguments of world-wide expediency. To say that they must judge in this way, is to deny to them any judgment at all on the question of war or peace.

If it is hard to know the right and the wrong, it is generally far harder to know what is expedient, except when we settle it through first knowing what is right. And however scornfully politicians may treat as stupid fanatics those who press the argument of right, they themselves urge it whenever they are anxious to impress the multitude. We have not forgotten the speech of Lord John Russell in 1854, against the Emperor Nicholas (called his 'brutal' speech by the *St. Petersburg Gazette*), which ended by appealing to God to defend **THE RIGHT**. That, as between Russia and Turkey, the Russians were 'wrong,' was a compact and intelligible argument; but whether it is 'expedient' for all parties concerned that the Turkish rule be sustained, cannot be fairly debated without plunging into the utmost vagueness of hypothesis. It may be apparently solved by interpreting as expedient whatever is immediately convenient to ourselves; but so base a measure of expediency no one dares to avow and recommend.

If it be admitted that through inferiority of intellect the millions cannot deal with the very diffuse argument of expediency as the foundation of right, and necessarily look on right as the foundation of expediency, an immense result follows, which no statesman ought to overlook. This weakness of nations (so let it just now be called) is apt to defeat all the calculations of the politician who shapes his course on the opposite

principle. Thus an English peer in 1852 remarked, 'he should have expected that the Hungarians would be proud of being subject to so great a Power as Austria.' That is to say, he was blind to the intense resentment felt by a nation when its rights are trampled on. Not feeling with it, he does not anticipate its action. He fancies that Austria is about to become very powerful, and to his surprise discovers that her breach of fundamental morality has reduced her to the brink of ruin.

In the Russian war the same perverse sympathy with Austria drove our Ministry into a course; by their own confession, most headlong. They were narrowly saved in the battle of Inkermann, and well that has been for Europe; but again we say, no thanks are due to their wisdom. To men who look at the right and the wrong, nothing could be plainer than the course which ought to have been pursued from the beginning of the Russian invasion. In 1848 the Sultan had granted to Wallachia numerous reforms, and was prepared to grant the same to Moldavia. Hereupon the Russian army entered Moldavia, and forced the Sultan to cancel these reforms, and drive into exile the patriots who had demanded them. Consequently, the moment the Turks declared war in 1853, on the renewed invasion of Moldavia, nothing was more obvious than to recal the exiles, proclaim anew the reformed constitutions, and occupy Wallachia before the Russians could advance into it. This the Turks were eager to do, but were forbidden by the Western ambassadors, because the English Ministry did not wish to offend Austria, whom they hoped to win to their side. Austria, having violently crushed freedom in Hungary and Transylvania, dreaded its establishment on her border; therefore was eager to occupy first Servia, then the two Principalities. In consequence the Turks were left, with the most uncertain result, to fight their battle unaided—after we had nominally joined them—after our armies had reached Varna. Since

single-handed they repelled the Russians on the Danube—though after a hard and terrible struggle—it is manifest that the aid of a fraction of the Western forces already at Varna would much earlier have decided the combat; and if we had urged the Sultan to consolidate the safety of the Principalities by renewing to them the constitution of 1848, peace might have followed. But as we had done nothing, and apparently 'had nothing else to do' (to use Lord John Russell's frank explanation), it was resolved to attack Sebastopol. We do not undervalue the magnificent result, but it was earned under risks incalculable: and the Ministry was driven into that course, not by any forecast of wisdom, not by any original necessity of duty, but because, to please Austria, they would not establish the just liberties of the Principalities.

Ministries change; but whether we have in power pure Whigs, pure Tories, or coalitions, the sympathy with Austria does not change. Against Russia, against France, intense animosity seems to be possible; even against Prussia the bitterest attacks were made on the Tory side and from the Court party in the Russian war; but Austria was screened with the greatest tenderness. Lord John Russell, having blown the war-trumpet boldly in the beginning, under the full conviction that Austria must at last come to our side, recommended ignominious surrender as soon as the truth broke on him that Austria did not dare to help us. But the facts which proved that Austria is no longer a great Power, no longer able to perform the functions of a great Power against Russian encroachment, seem only to have called out the fond tenderness of our statesmen for her recovery. As soon as the French Emperor in 1859 avowed his dissatisfaction with the Austrian policy in Italy in so marked a way as to imply that he might give warlike aid to Sardinia, the sympathy of the Derby Ministry with Austria was proclaimed in terms most distinct. Lords Derby and Malmesbury both

spoke out in Parliament, scornfully warning Sardinia against her upstart course, and asserting the *rights* of Austria to Venetia and Lombardy. When the war was begun, they tried to extort from the French Government a pledge that in no case should Croatia be attacked; and when of course met by the reply that while Austria drew troops and resources from Croatia, that country could not enjoy the advantages of neutrality, they sent the English fleet to the Adriatic, and with the greatest activity prepared for war against France. From that horrible calamity England and Europe were saved by the displacement of the Derby Ministry. Lords Palmerston and Russell were believed to have come into power on a pledge to Mr. Bright and others, that in no case whatever should naval or military aid be given to Austria. Yet the arming against France (distinctly avowed by Lord Palmerston as such), and the despatch of Lord John Russell on August 31st last, certainly imply that the present Ministry intends (if allowed by Parliament) to pursue in 1861 precisely the course designed by the Derby Ministry in 1859; and the alleged justification is, jealousy of France. And this leads to the inquiry, how far is this jealousy of France justifiable, and how far ought it to be allowed to carry us?

If any one outright avows that England has deeply humiliated France, and *therefore* can never trust her, and *therefore* is bound to resist all aggrandizement of France, however honourable its means—we understand his logic, though we do not yield to it. It would pledge us to unjust wars for the mere purpose of keeping France weak; and as a policy, it must certainly fail: first, because it would rouse against us the just enmity of all the parties and classes of that great nation; next, because it would enable the French Emperor to rally to himself against us the sympathies of all the free men of Europe, by the very simple course of promoting their freedom against German or Russian tyranny. In the case of Italy we

already see how successfully he has done this. By the splendid services he performed in the spring of 1859, and by imposing neutrality on Austria and Spain through the whole of 1860, he has determined the freedom of Italy, which the Derby Ministry was so vehement to forbid his accomplishing. In the first half of the year 1859 we know what disgust the Italians felt towards English policy and towards England for its sake. Evidently, if that policy had been persevered in, Napoleon could have rallied all Italy into a bond of hatred against us; and in like manner he would be able to draw into his influence against us Croatia, Hungary, Servia, Bulgaria, the Danubian Principalities, perhaps also Greece and Poland, if England assumed as her rule of conduct to oppose every effort of France on the side of oppressed nations, lest France turn their sympathy to her own advantage.

It is a calamity to us that our forefathers pursued France with indiscriminate animosity, and humiliated her in every corner of the globe. We must in consequence count on some enmity from the French, and it would not be prudent to expose ourselves to it unarmed. But surely this is a reason for trying to soothe, not to exasperate the evil. Every French government, since Louis XVIII., has endeavoured to raise the military and naval force of France to a standard proportionate to that of the eighteenth century; nor can we hinder this by any direct opposition. Notoriously, in his increase of the navy, the present Emperor has merely carried out the plans of Louis Philippe; and the grounds of this are to every Frenchman quite on the surface. They say, 'While England has so great a fleet to threaten us with, we need a proportionate fleet to maintain our self-respect, that our marine

may not be at her mercy.' Then, on seeing the French fleet increasing, the English admirals, and in due time the newspapers, cry out that it is built *against us*; and that we must increase our forces still more. Thus the two nations are in a vicious circle, and it is hard to deny that we are primarily in the wrong. For we start from the assumption, that of course we are to have a fleet enormously superior to that of France, because we do not find it convenient to keep an army equal to that of France. But the Frenchman replies that his army, as such, is *not* an offensive force against us islanders; while our fleet, as such, *is* an offensive force against his seaports and shipping; therefore our resolution to keep superior disposable offensive armaments forces his government into the defensive armaments of which we complain as offensive.

Without entering into the question, what other\* course England might pursue, these considerations (we think) ought to abate largely the *resentment* which has been so extensively felt against the increase of the French navy. No one will imagine that Louis Philippe ever dreamed of invading England or of making a sudden attack on our colonies or ships; yet he planned, ordered, and partially executed the scheme which has been thought so offensive in Napoleon III. It appeared in 1859 in what way an English Ministry may think fit to use an English fleet—not to defend the shores of England, but to forbid France from aiding Italian liberties by attacking Austria at home. Every class of Frenchmen, from republicans to legitimists, is resolved not to submit to such dictation from England, and therefore will insist on raising the strength of their navy in proportion as we raise ours. Grumble at this as we may, we shall quite miscalculate if we impute to offensive intentions

\* To enact a monthly holiday, and upon it a *compulsory* training of *all* youths between eighteen and twenty-three to shoot at a mark (*not* to be drilled), would for ever put at rest all fear of invasion, if we had not even a ship at sea, nor any but a skeleton army. And this would only be to return to the old law and practice of England. No foreigner could regard such a proceeding as offensive.

that which in the French conception is purely defensive.

From these general considerations we turn to the special character and conduct of Napoleon III., to inquire how far they justify jealousy of France. His first European act after he became president, was his attack on the Roman republic. Whatever severity of judgment we might in the abstract pronounce on this, is practically overthrown by the fact that he previously obtained the consent of Lord John Russell's cabinet. Whether hatred of republicanism actuated them, or whether they made sure that Austria would restore the Pope if France did not, and fancied they were doing Rome a service by stipulating for an improved constitution, we have no means of deciding. At any rate, the Prince President faithfully endeavoured to obtain from the Pope various important ameliorations in the internal government; but was met by absolute refusal, under Austrian advice. After this, more than two years later, followed his violent and treacherous overthrow of the constitution by which he had been made president. It does not belong to us to criticize this from a French point of view; but the effect it produced upon English politicians concerns us properly, and is very notable. It instantly produced a panic in Parliament itself, lest he should invade England! Even Mr. Joseph Hume implored honourable members to shut their mouths and restrain their feelings, remembering that England was unarmed. In a short time, Parliament, with a unanimity and facility long unknown, voted six hundred thousand pounds for building a new fleet; and that very fleet of screw steamers was built against Louis Napoleon, which in 1854 sailed in alliance with the French fleet against Bomarsund and Cronstadt. This is surely a very notable phenomenon.

It is a received general principle, that a usurper has enough to do in holding his ground at home against the resentment of his own nation, and can never have spare strength

to volunteer an arduous foreign war. A single military failure would assuredly cost him his crown; much less could he expect persevering sacrifices from his nation. Unless therefore we are to attribute to public men a remarkable timidity, there must have been some great peculiarity in the crisis which justified it. And we think there was. The overthrow of freedom in France made a universal coalition of the despots possible, and even easy; for had Nicholas so coalesced with Louis Napoleon, Austria and all Germany must have followed. As in 1823 the 'holy alliance' sent France to put down the liberties of Spain, a like combination might have been made against England in 1852; for at that time our reception of exiles, and the free comments of our press, made us the mark of hatred to all the despotisms of Europe.

In so far, it was but prudent to arm, nor do we blame that jealousy. For more than a year the policy of the French President was uncertain to us, perhaps was uncertain to himself. His first palpable act was a most striking one, and has stamped his policy ever since. He discerned the intentions of Russia against Turkey, and resolved to oppose them. In March, 1853, he ordered the French fleet to the Dardanelles, in order to support the Sultan against Prince Menchikoff. The Aberdeen Ministry, which by means of the secret correspondence had official knowledge of the ulterior designs of Nicholas, protested against Napoleon's act, alleging that Menchikoff's quarrel was limited to the ecclesiastical question between Russia and France; and by this protest extorted the recal of the French fleet. Admiral Dundas had already refused to comply with the request of Colonel Rose for the support of the English fleet. It was clearly in the power of the English Cabinet to be inactive, while Napoleon implicated himself on the side of Turkey and of justice against Russia; and had they done this, they could afterwards have dictated their own terms to him as to the

aid we would give in the war. But, whatever it was or was not right for them to do, it was undeniable from that moment that the French Emperor had no designs against England. Previously, indeed, while still a constitutional president, in 1851, he had extorted from the Sultan, by the threats of M. Lavalette, certain privileges for the Latin Christians in Turkey, which so excited the anger of the Emperor Nicholas, as perhaps more than anything else to have determined the course of events.

From March, 1853, onward, Louis Napoleon has played a great and memorable part in Europe, and we see not how any constitutional statesman can deny that it has been an eminently beneficial part. His army, so outnumbering ours, was the principal agent of success in the actual conflicts of the Russian war. He concluded, indeed, that war against our will, to the general disgust of England; and yet, seeing as we now see how effectual a wound Russia has received, few among us will deny that his judgment was correct. Without constraint upon Prussia and Austria, the restoration of Poland was impossible; yet that alone could permanently weaken Russia. No smaller prize of contest could have justified the vast sacrifices of continued war. At the Congress which determined the peace, Napoleon gave a marked support to Count Cavour in regard to the sufferings of Italy, with especial reference to the Papal territories. In the next year he joined us in withdrawing his ambassador from Naples in avowed disgust at the atrocious misgovernment of the King; and it is believed that he was anxious for some stronger measures if the English Cabinet would have given its moral support. At the same time his diplomacy was active in urging Austria to consent to great administrative reforms in the Papal States. The details were first communicated to the public in the celebrated pamphlet, *Napoleon III. and Italy*, which sums up the Emperor's proposals to Austria as

follows:—1. Secularization of the administrative power, by the formation of a Council of State formed of laymen and charged to examine and discuss laws. 2. Representation of all the interests of the country in a *Conseille* elected directly by the Provincial Councils, or at least chosen by the Pope out of a list of candidates presented by these Councils, and called to deliberate on all the laws and to vote the budget. 3. Effectual control of local expenses by the Provincial Councils, receiving their delegation from the Municipal Councils, who are themselves named by the electors conformably to the edict of 24th November, 1850. 4. Judiciary Reform by the promulgation of a code of civil laws based on the Code Napoleon, or on the Lombardo-Venetian code, or on that of Naples. 5. Regular collection of the public revenues by an organization similar to that of France. 6. Reconciliation of all classes and opinions by an enlightened clemency to all who will submit respectfully to the Sovereign Pontiff. Such were the ameliorations which Napoleon, before determining on war, strove to win for Italy by peaceful diplomacy. The same pamphlet assures us that he supported the scheme of a federation of all Italy under the Pope. This was the only form of union possible without revolution and the overthrow of the princes; also to this, Ferdinand II. of Naples had given his voluntary adhesion in 1848. It is therefore utterly unjust and false to say that Napoleon III. entered into the war of 1859 merely to employ his army or to steal territory. Having exhausted the forces of diplomacy (with the approbation of England) at Vienna and at Naples, he finally aided Piedmont to repress and humiliate Austria, whose force and obstinacy forbade amelioration in Italy. In restoring the Pope he had entered into a pledge with the English Government that the Papal territories should have an improved constitution. By overthrowing their Republican liberty he had contracted moral obligations to the

population itself. But these obligations he had for ten years been forced to neglect, because Austria forbade; and while Russia backed Austria behind, Italy could not be freed. At length, after Russia had been at once severely crippled in herself and profoundly disgusted with Austria, the French force was equal, and yet only just equal, to the task of securing to Italy her own self-government.

The chief organs of the English press and the whole Tory party were furious against Napoleon for his undertaking the Italian war in 1859. They were almost as angry with him for the peace of Villafranca.\* Instantly the wildest absurdities, invented in the Orleanist circles of Paris, were sent abroad over England. Napoleon had secretly coalesced with Francis Joseph to make joint war upon Prussia or upon England! From the day that the French army entered Italy, it had been pretended that we more than before needed to arm. The cry became louder than ever after the peace. A volunteer army was urgently recommended. The cry for more fortifications became intense. And why? Because France had displayed so great military energy. Let this have what weight it may; though it seems very clear that the two great victories were won by the disaffection of Italians, Hungarians, and Croats in the Austrian ranks, were won very narrowly, and were productive of effects so vast only by the hatred of the Italians for the tyrannies which oppressed them. But it cannot be pretended that the political acts of Napoleon justified any of the ferment made against him and the zeal for English armaments. Under threat of war from Prussia he

stopped short in his Italian career, again showing his habitual self-control; nevertheless, firmly holding Austria back, he enabled the Italians to reform themselves. Thus he has gained† for them a priceless advantage; while English diplomatists who can lecture foreign powers so ably did not give to Italy even kind words until the last moment, after victory was achieved everywhere in the field.

It is humiliating to us to note with how great reason the Bonapartists extol the superiority of French to English policy. The English Cabinet approved of the French invasion of Rome, extorted from Napoleon the condition that the Pope should establish an improved government, and then was distressed that force was used against the Romans, and became seriously angry when the same force was at length applied against Austria, who had hindered Napoleon from fulfilling the pledge which he gave to England. The English Cabinet, through Lord Minto, stimulated the Italian hopes of freedom, and then, from tenderness to Austria and hatred of Republicanism, did all that diplomacy could do to ruin freedom. The English Cabinet, with the secret correspondence in its hands, publicly pretended that Russia had no ulterior designs against Turkey; and by thus appearing to the Russians to be in collusion with them against France, stimulated Nicholas to precipitate himself on Turkey, and made the war inevitable. Napoleon, without having seen the secret correspondence, discerned the plain state of the facts,‡ and showed so early a hostility as would have made Nicholas recede ere it was too late, if England had not at that crisis played the Russian game. England,

\* With no small reason did Count de Morny, in his speech soon after, say—'If the English, who say we have done too little for the Italians, would have given as much energy to their cause before the war, as they avow after the peace, the freedom of Italy might perhaps have been won in Congress, without any war at all.'

† If he had wished to stop Garibaldi's career, one whisper to the Austrian ambassador as soon as Garibaldi landed at Marsala would have done it effectually. The abstinence of Austria proves the complacency of Napoleon in this great revolution.

‡ So did Colonel Bose, whom Lord Aberdeen did not thank for his straightforwardness.

in withdrawing her ambassador from Naples, and in allowing Count Cavour to bring before the Congress of Paris the internal misgovernment of the Papal dominions, made a public avowal that the state of Italy was exceptional and was not to be dealt with by ordinary national rules; in fact, that the princes of Italy deserved to be put out of the pale of civilized potentates. All the misery of Italy was notoriously due to the guilt of Austria, was the direct fruit of the celebrated Secret Treaty of Austria with Naples in 1815, by which Naples had ever since become a virtual appanage to the European power of Austria. England, we say, was shocked at the miseries of Italy; yet not only would not put out a little finger to remedy them herself, but fell into violent invective against Sardinia as soon as it transpired that France and Sardinia were resolved to endure them no longer.

It is wholesome and necessary to repeat and dwell on these things; for it is too clear that since the death of Mr. Canning all the English Cabinets have fallen into the puerile imbecility of desiring *cures* and shrinking from *remedies*. The cavaliers of Charles I. wished the king to rule well and honourably, but could not bear to have him *compelled* to be legal. So our ministries can give plenty of good advice to Austria, but rally to her side the moment the attempt is made to coerce her. Lord John Russell's two despatches to Turin of August 31st and October 27th, 1860, have fixed the eyes of Europe on the monstrous inconsistencies of our foreign policy.\* In the former he assumes a stern and almost hostile tone against Sardinia, in case of her 'attacking the

domains of the Emperor of Austria, or the King of Naples.' In the latter, after the Sardinian armies have invaded the Roman and Neapolitan territories, Lord John Russell distinctly and elaborately justifies the deed. In the former he sides with 'the Great Powers' against Sardinia, hinting that England will even aid Austria with her fleet if Venetia be attacked. In the latter, he assumes a broad argument, which is as available to justify invasion of Venetia as invasion of Naples. The populations of the Roman and Neapolitan States, says he, felt that they were misgoverned. They had a right to judge of this for themselves. They had a right to accept the aid of the King of Sardinia; therefore the King is not to be blamed for giving the aid. Lord John proves it by reference to Vattel, and to our own William of Orange. And [is it possible that he does not see all this to confute his own previous despatch? If Romans and Neapolitans may judge whether their rulers are tyrannical, and may call in the aid of Sardinia, why may not Venetians? He surely does not doubt the fact that Venice is as much disaffected as ever Naples was? At the same time, the *tone* of the two notes is contrasted still more strangely. The former is scornful and dictatorial to Sardinia, not only laying down duties for her, but lecturing her about her weakness, treating Count Cavour as delirious† if he dare to enter war against Austria, and sarcastically telling him that that power would not be sorry for an opportunity of restoring the Romagna to the Pope, and Tuscany to the Grand Duke. It declares that Sardinia will have no 'chance' of success, except by bringing France into the field, and

\* Since writing the above, we see in the correspondence from Berlin, that 'Sweden, unable to trust in England, through the eternal vacillations of English cabinets, has resolved to enter into close alliance with Prussia, with a view to hinder the dominion of Russia over the coasts of the Baltic.' These vacillations are the necessary results of secret diplomacy; yet it is pretended that this unconstitutional and pernicious system is essential to uphold the influence of England abroad!

† In the despatch as officially published in England we read—'Let not Count Cavour indulge in so pernicious a *delusion*.' This is coarse enough; but the Sardinians allege that the original was *delirium*.

kindling a general war in Europe. This the Great Powers are resolved to forbid, 'and Great Britain has interests in the Adriatic which her Majesty's Government must watch with careful attention.' But in the second despatch Lord John assumes the tone of one who is more favourable than France to Sardinia. 'Her Majesty's Government,' he says, 'can see no sufficient ground for the severe censure with which Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia have visited the acts of the King of Sardinia.'

Worst of all, the despatch of August 31st vindicates the right of Austria to Venice, asserting that an attack from Sardinia would be 'a wanton aggression,' and must fail against 'Austria, fighting in a just cause, to maintain her violated territory.' Now to this part of the subject we invite our readers' special attention. What is the RIGHT of Austria to Venice? We have no need to plunge into any depths of moral metaphysics, we have not to analyse the word 'nationality,' when we assert that in 1796 Venice was a nation, a constituted government, a recognised power of Europe a thousand years old, and an ally of Austria; an older power than England, and having national rights as truly as England. Napoleon I. overran and conquered Venice in the name of democracy, and in 1797 presented it to Austria by the peace of Campo Formio. Such was the primary right of Austria to it. When war was renewed, the French reconquered Venetia, and held it until calamities fell thick on Napoleon; upon which the Austrian armies re-occupied it as their rightful possession. The congress of Vienna, which unwillingly rewarded Alexander I. with the Duchy of Warsaw and with Finland, willingly gave to Austria continental Venetia, and to England the Venetian islands. Thenceforward, English statesmen insist that Austria has a right to Venice.

We do not intend to censure the English plenipotentiary at that Congress by placing the deeds of the Congress under the full light

of later events. If a new spirit of legality and fidelity had come into the Austrian dynasty, no one can say that it might not in thirty years have won the loyal heart of the Venetians. We do not for a moment overlook that nearly all empires are in their origin formed on no other right than superior force. We do not apply to Venice and Austria principles which would tear all empires asunder; nor do we shrink to apply everywhere the principles which we insist on applying to Venice. A violent conquest by a superior force is in politics closely analogous to the violent abduction of a woman. If some Achilles slaughters the husband of a Briseis, and violently takes her to his bed, no one imagines that his superior force, while it is mere force, gives him any rights. But if, after a while, despairing of a better fate, after old griefs are dry, she reconciles herself to her captor, moral ties between them supervene, and we recognise the union as a *bonâ fide* marriage. Nay, if after a true loyalty between the two has been established, an attempt be made to break their union, in revenge for the original violence, we pronounce this to be a making of new wounds under pretence of healing old ones. In applying the analogy to empires, the principle is strengthened by the passing away of old generations. The grandchildren of the conquered and the grandson of the conqueror are in a relation more favourable for reconciliation than if the same individuals lived on for ever; and if a real moral union has intervened, as between Wales and England, *this* (and certainly not the original violence) constitutes the right of the ruler over the ruled. But if a woman, violently carried off, is never reconciled to her captor; if, with the progress of time, there is not only no progress towards moral relations, but an ever-increasing exasperation, a need of permanent violence to hinder her escape, with cruelties and suffering incident to that violence, then the universal conscience of mankind avows that no lapse of time can confer a right

of possession. That which was originally a crime is not only still a crime, but is of ever deepening intensity. Statesmen are apt to assume that long possession constitutes a right, because long possession ordinarily softens feud and raises up in the conquered country at least a large internal party which sides with the conqueror, especially when the conquering race colonizes into the other, and intermarriages are common. The feud of Irish and English has lasted down to our own day; yet so large and intelligent and spirited a fraction of the native Irish has energetically adhered to the English policy and Empire, that no English statesman could be justified in abandoning them to civil war, nor would any moralist from without advise it. Much the same, we believe, may be said of Posen, owing to the large immigration of Prussians into the Polish area. But Venice, treacherously accepted and violently treated in 1797, seized on during Napoleon's fall with smooth professions of constitutionalism, has seen herself cheated of every promise, and is every ten years more and more bitterly hostile, more and more needs violent constraint. Even at the peace of Villafranca, Francis Joseph stipulated to make Venice a strictly Italian province, with national institutions, and (to use his very word) to make the Venetians *happy*. He was probably sincere; but he did not dare to fulfil his undertaking. Violent arrests and deportations, every form of arbitrary force, are the substitute for the promised national administration. The Austrians themselves do not pretend to have any native party in Venice. Thus it is no matter of surmise, but is a public European fact, that there never has been even an incipient or partial loyalty in Venice; and that its wrongful seizure is a crime, not obsolete by its antiquity, but perpetuated to this moment with exasperation. The enormous emigration of the military population is another public manifestation of the state of feeling.

Lord John Russell knows all this,

yet he allows himself to talk of the *rights* of Austria to Venice. He is not an absolute stickler for the deeds of the Congress of 1815. To say nothing of Belgium, and Poland, and Cracow, and a Napoleon on the French throne, he has justified the King of Sardinia in driving out the Pope and the King of Naples from territories guaranteed to them by that Congress. How are we to understand or explain his totally different treatment of Austria?

There are those who say that the very similar behaviour of Whigs in office to Tories, as far as Austria is concerned, is determined by a force *behind* the Crown, unseen to the nation. The son of the King of Belgium has married an Austrian princess. According to these interpreters, Lord John's despatch of August 31st (which first saw the light in Cologne, immediately after the meeting of the Queen with the Prince Regent of Prussia), expresses the Prusso-Belgian policy; but the despatch of October 27th is the true Russell policy. Others see in these vacillations the marks of a struggle in the Cabinet, with alternate victory. We do not undertake to clear up these mysteries; but the fact of a contrariety of principle is manifest, and calls upon Parliament and the nation to express itself distinctly. The former despatch is full of exasperation against Sardinia, indicates suspicion against France, and avows complacent trust in the wisdom of the (other) 'Great Powers,' to whom England, by reason of her interests in the Adriatic, will give (at least) moral support, if Sardinia dare wantonly to violate that rightful possession of Austria—Venice! Seeing the enormous results pending, Englishmen are surely bound to declare how they will feel if the fleets or diplomacy of England aid Austria to perpetuate her tyranny.

But the core of the matter is not yet touched. We have heard, and we believe, that when the Sardinian ambassador asked of Lord Palmerston an explanation of the former despatch, he received a frank reply that her Majesty's Government would be delighted to see Austria

freely hand over Venice to the King of Sardinia; but a war between the two Powers could not be confined to the area of Venetia: it would necessarily overflow into Croatia, and would give Hungary an opportunity of separating herself from Austria. *This* would be hostile to English interests, and *this* is what her Majesty's Government would resist.

It is surely important to elicit from the ministers whether this is their policy, this their way of promoting constitutionalism in Hungary. If on any question of foreign affairs this nation has distinctly pronounced itself, it is on sympathy with Hungary. Our ancestors could not enforce legality on the kings except by expelling the Stuarts. To discard a treacherous dynasty is perhaps the only mode for a nation to secure its liberties. The Hungarians have had three hundred years' experience of Austrian perfidy. In the last struggle, the dynasty secretly roused against them rebels and robbers whom it publicly stigmatized and disowned, and finally, when beaten, called in against Hungary the Russian armies. Now if, after all this, it so happen that the Hungarian nation despairs of the dynasty, and refuses to give it a new trial, what right has the English Cabinet to lay down that (for the sake of English interests) the Hungarians shall keep a hated dynasty, of tried and proved perfidy? Lord John's second despatch recites as a cumulative justification of Sardinia, that in 1820-1, the liberties of all Italy had been put down by Austrian force. Why then is he to forget that in 1849 the liberty and hereditary law of Hungary was put down by Russian force?

Only one answer have we ever heard. Lord Palmerston wants a 'strong Austria' as a support against Russia. What is this, but to say that he wants a dying man to be strong? It is surely time to look the facts in the face. Even if Venetia were ceded to Sardinia without war; even if Francis Joseph resign, and his brother

Maximilian take the empire, that empire cannot be strong for a long while. Would England, if her liberties had been crushed for ten years by the treachery of her dynasty and by German armies, be tranquillized as soon as it had compelled a restoration of the constitution, while troops of pure Celtic blood and language, together with Kaffir, Negro, Sikh, and Hindoo regiments, still filled our barracks and fortresses, and all English regiments were sent abroad? Of course, the moment a Parliament met, a struggle would commence to get rid of the foreign, and bring home the English armies. The same struggle must arise in Hungary, and the dynasty will not dare to yield. But this is not all. Hungary has *never* been an integral part of the Austrian 'Empire'; legally, the 'Emperor' was only *king* of Hungary, a detached nation with separate laws. The Diet was not responsible for the debts of Austria, against which it always protested, and it is not likely to recognise the debts of the last ten years. The present movement of Hungary takes for its starting point the denial of its union with the Austrian Empire; and in token of this, the Imperial arms are everywhere pulled down. To restore the legal constitution, and faithfully fulfil it, is, in the avowal of the Austrians themselves, to tear the Empire in pieces; inasmuch as the Diet at Pesth may pursue a totally different foreign policy from the Diets at Vienna or Prague, supposing that free constitutions are extended to them. This indeed is the only justification which the Austrians have attempted for their violent usurpations; that these were necessary to *Europe*, in order to give military unity to their empire. Thus Austria has three imaginable courses; *first*, to keep up an avowed and pure despotism. This was tried for ten years, and has broken down as untenable. *Secondly*, to make a central Parliament, which should contain representatives from all the countries, and should degrade the Hungarian Diet into a municipal council. The

attempt to enforce this brought on the fatal war of 1848-9. It was resumed last autumn; but it is now notorious that it can only perpetuate bitter discontent; and that, not merely because the individual Francis Joseph is distrusted, but because the Hungarian nation demands its hereditary legal rights, whatever the name of its king. *Thirdly*, it is possible to restore *bonâ fide* the old law, and observe it with a faithfulness never yet dreamed of by an Austrian. But if this be done, then (as the dynasty itself will tell Lord Palmerston) Austria is no longer a strong *empire*, but is, like Germany, a patchwork of ill-confederated freedoms. And is it to gain for Europe such a defence against Russia, that a Whig ministry wishes to violate the obvious right of the injured nation of Hungary?

We would not deny, that if full harmony were restored between the Crown and the nation, the Diet itself might at length so modify the constitution as to blend the dominions of Austria into a single compact empire. But after the past events, and with such a history as that of the House of Hapsburg, this development could only be very slow. Under the present dynasty the nation must be intensely conservative of its historical traditions, intensely averse to lose them in any combination with the other countries. A century of faithful legality on the part of the Crown would hardly be too much to allow for such a result. Meanwhile, Germany would be kept weak by the existence of the Austrian power, and Austria not be strong; and Europe be without due barrier against France and against Russia.

Perhaps before these words meet the public eye, a new attempt will be made to obscure the rights of Venice and Hungary by blowing the war-cry against France. Bavaria is probably pledged to support Austria against Italy; France also is probably pledged to Sardinia, not to allow foreign aid to Austria. If our Government wish to prevent France entering the new war, a

way is open to them, by joining France in insisting that no German State shall aid Austria; then it is quite certain that all Germany will abstain from the war. But if Bavaria and Prussia, for the convenience of Austria, garrison the Tyrol, Bohemia, and Hungary, and if thereupon France join Sardinia, the war which may ensue will be indirectly, yet effectually the result of English sympathy with Austria.

Before we allow ourselves to be carried away by blind prejudice and ancient rancour against France, let two more considerations be well weighed. 1. With whatever right pure republicans like Mazzini may hate the French Emperor, all those with whom royalty is a cause so sacred as to justify war-like interventions, ought to be grateful to Louis Napoleon as the man who has made great Republics in Europe impossible. Had he been faithful to his duties, and honourably acknowledged the Roman republic, Georgey could never have made his conspiracy, and the Hungarian republic would have stood in spite of Russia. If the liberties of France, Italy, and Hungary were republican, German liberty would most likely have taken the same course. Napoleon has forbidden it. 2. After his overthrow of liberty in Italy and France, and the treachery of the German Princes to their subjects, nothing else was to be expected but that the next struggle in Europe would be that of Republicans against Absolutists, with no party at all aiming at constitutional royalty. Certainly for awhile this party vanished, in disgust at the worthlessness of royal oaths. It has been restored, primarily, in a moral sense, by the noble faithfulness of Victor Emmanuel and the intrepid policy of Count Cavour; but secondarily, in a military sense, by the coalition of France with Sardinia. Hereby the Emperor has virtually made himself the leader of freedom, the leader of the republicans, whether they like him or not. He has gained a *moderating* position, in which he does not originate, but controls, inevitable

movements of revolution, dictating that they shall in every case be royalist, and bridling all contingent democratic fury by the hope of his powerful aid. Thus a contest which might be desolating and lingering, he deprives of all its most dangerous properties, while allowing the forces of society to gravitate into their natural places, by which alone they can make a true breakwater against foreign action. England might aid this great and good work. Hitherto she has chosen to stand aloof, and has prudentially refused to succour Sicily, Naples, Spain, Poland, Lombardy, or Hungary. All her exploits of late in Western Europe are confined to her crushing the constitutional liberty of Portugal in 1847. And now, if France chooses to pursue a braver course, shall England feel hostility lest French aggrandizement follow? The way to hinder it is, not to thwart, but to assist France whenever the cause is intrinsically a good one. As regards a bulwark against Russia, we cannot construct or reconstruct empires; but the elements of a new and really powerful kingdom are obvious on the banks of the Danube. If Austria fall, Germany will run together, and the Queen's grandson become King of Germany, perhaps with Switzerland combined; that is no bad bulwark; and to a free Hungary, it is highly probable that Servia and the Principalities will join themselves, if Western policy favour such a development.

Our readers must not suppose that we are blind to the misdeeds of Napoleon III. in Italy for the last two months. As to Rome, we are not sure that he is to be censured; that depends on his after

policy. He has damped and restrained the impetus of the Spanish and German Catholics, and has beneficially retarded the moment of papal despair, until Italy shall be organized and strong. But his interference in Gaëta has gone beyond the mark of this, and has visibly prolonged the disorganization and weakness of Italy. We trust that our Government will be able to dispel the suspicion which has been expressed, that it has seen with complacency this conduct of the Emperor, in hope that it will cripple Italy and make a war for the recovery of Venice impossible. We confess the present aspect of things suggests, that Napoleon is still struggling to bring about a division of Italy into two States. If England desires a united Italy, the way to it is by supporting the Italian movement; certainly not by supporting Austria under the plea of jealousy against France. The French Emperor, by nature and by position, can do nothing straightforwardly. He cannot afford to avow noble objects with the simplicity of a Garibaldi. But it remains possible that ere long he may say to the English ministry: 'You have wished for a united Italy; have your wish; but now learn, that the inevitable result is a war on Austria, and an invasion of Hungary; a war which I have deprecated, but in which I feel bound to become a contingent ally to Italy, so far as to insist that Austria shall receive no aid.' It is well that Englishmen should pronounce whether they will thereupon allow the British forces to aid an old and pernicious despotism against Hungary and Italy, and give to France the avowed leadership of liberty.

