

CAUSE AND OBJECTS OF THE CRIMEAN WAR.¹

BY FRANCIS WILLIAM NEWMAN.

THE readers of this Magazine will be aware that the Editor and his coadjutors have warmly supported the judgment and sentiment, which is at length clearly national, strongly adverse to the Ottoman rule over certain provinces of South-Eastern Europe. Just now, the European Christians subject to Turkey chiefly draw out our sympathies, and especially the cruelly outraged Bulgarians. That for *them* something effectual may presently be done, and will be done, if England give an earnest moral support to Russia, is regarded by the nation at large, and by the freest-minded of our writers, as beyond doubt. It may not be at all logical or consistent with the extreme views professed by the members of the Peace Society, to desire the aid of Russian, German, or Austrian arms; though evidently mere words will be unavailing; but most of us will thank the Peace Society that in this crisis they have so vigorously opposed the principle of English support to Turkey, and have striven to moderate all needless and erring jealousy of Russian power. This article is not written against that part of their conduct. But they are not satisfied with trying to strengthen the hands of Russia *now*. They, over and above, assume the position of accusers against England collectively and the Ministers of England in the matter of the Crimean War. They take up the quarrel of Mr. John Bright against the England of 1853, and diligently teach to the new generation the Quaker version of

those events. In twenty-three years, the youths of twenty-three (an age at which few read political documents) are become men of forty-six; in short, are passing into the *seniores*. Very few beneath the age of forty-five remember anything of the *right or wrong* of the Crimean War. They know that the Sultans have not been able to enforce their own just and wise edicts in favour of the Christians; that loans to Turkey (introduced by Lord Palmerston's initiation and promotion) have been damaging to the lenders and wasted by the borrowers, and that the problem of uniting Turks and Christians into constitutional equality is, after trial, insoluble. Hence, all the younger men are open to believe the perpetually repeated assertion from the Quaker side concerning the Crimean War. Only this party has cared to agitate the subject at all. They have had the field to themselves. The Peace Society now constantly advertises Mr. Henry Richard's pamphlet (written in 1855) which is named at the foot of this page, and enforces its conclusions in the *Herald of Peace* on numberless occasions. They pretend that the increased expenses of our military establishments are a legacy of the Crimean War, which (they say) inflamed us with a war spirit; and this passes as fact. Yet all elder men ought to know that Mr. Warner's persistent preaching of 'long range,'—that is, of cannon which should carry five or six miles,—was gradually converted into fact. Simultaneously the im-

¹ *History of the Origin of the War with Russia*. By Henry Richard, Esq., M.P. Street, London.

drawn up from the Parliamentary Office of the Peace Society, 19 New Broad

provement of the old musket went on. The Prussian needle-gun was very effective in 1848; since which, all the Governments have been driven, *quite independently of the Crimean War*, to adopt modern rifles, and at vast expense remodel their ordnance. By omission of such facts, and of the whole history of Russian encroachment, and pre-eminently by omitting the history of Nicolas,² whose fair words cannot be wisely interpreted except under the light of his acts, history is falsified, individual statesmen are dealt with unjustly, and the whole English nation is slandered. *Really* slandered, though Mr. Henry Richard is not only an eminently good man, but is in the opinion of the present writer a wise man. Nevertheless, there is a fanaticism for peace, as truly as a fanaticism for war, which often hinders good men from seeing a cardinal side of the question.

Mr. Richard intends to tell all the facts of the case, and thinks he begins at the beginning, when he starts from the dispute between France and Russia about the Holy Places. But this is not at all the beginning needed, if anyone is to judge fairly of the transactions. With the English people at large, the beginning was, the Emperor Nicolas's invasion of Hungary: with our statesmen, the history of Russian aggression began from 1814, as soon as Napoleon I. was defeated. During our great Continental war, the troops of the amiable Alexander I. had been admitted into Warsaw as a military aid; but thenceforward he kept his place by force. On the return of Napoleon from Elba, who, to win his alliance, offered to confirm him in the Duchy of Warsaw, Alexander used the offer to extort the consent of his

allies. Austria and Prussia had best reason to resent this act; but England and France were also indignant at it. To win over the Poles, Alexander granted at the moment a liberal constitution; but in 1817 he destroyed this by a simple *coup d'état*, and thenceforward reigned arbitrarily. The stupid savagery of his brother Constantine made the life of the Poles miserable; so that in 1830, after that French revolution which brought Louis Philippe to the throne, they revolted, at first with success. But Nicolas, the new emperor, by his vast resources crushed them—Europe remaining passive—and treated their leaders with cruel rigour. He proceeded to persecute the Catholic religion of the Poles. The persecution, being adopted by policy, was systematic; in general probably not beyond what in the early part of the last century might have been thought reasonable by every power; but his scourging of nuns made his name infamous. Other Russian sovereigns had torn Poland to pieces for the crime of injustice to 'Dissidents' or dissenters from the Catholic religion of Rome; Nicolas by his intolerance displayed how flimsy was that pretence, and forfeited all right to expect deference as a champion of Dissidents in Turkey. He had already assumed this character. When Mr. Canning, in 1827, made the Treaty of London in the interest of insurgent Greece, and (as a consequence, unforeseen and unintended) the battle of Navarino was fought, which annihilated the Turco-Egyptian fleet, Nicolas immediately changed his position from that of a mediator to that of an open enemy. The crisis was extremely difficult to the Sultan. The Servians during the Greek struggle of seven years

² The Emperor Nicolas always signed himself *Nicolas* in our Blue-books, which alone is correct Greek—*Νικόλας*, not *Νικολας*.

had revolted, and were not yet pacified. Albania and parts of Anatolia were disaffected by the severe conscription; indeed, the Sultan had needed to raise a great army against his own bodyguard the Janissaries, and numbers of Moslems were disaffected by the slaughter of these troops—a dreadful deed, to which the Sultan was driven by their mutinous spirit and high pretensions. Christian Europe was alienated by the cruel massacres in Scio (1822). The Sultan's new troops were but half trained in European discipline, and all was in a state of transition; his infantry had not yet even boots of tanned leather; and his fleet had just been destroyed; his artillery was of the worst kind. Even so, the Turkish cimetar proved very formidable. The Pasha of Varna, perhaps in despair, accepted a bribe from Russia, who, not without arduous fighting and terrible loss, was at length victorious in 1829. The terms of peace which Nicolas imposed upon the Sultan were so severe—so evidently directed to destroy the independence of Turkey—as to elicit from Lord Aberdeen—lover of peace as he was—a remarkably strong remonstrance, which was given to the public first in 1854. The severity of this humiliation soon bore its bitter fruit. In the crisis at which great pecuniary payments were demanded of the Sultan by Russia, the more distant Pashas despised him, and several of them withheld their tribute. At first, the greatest of these was the Pasha of Bagdad, against whom after about two years a war was undertaken. Plague and inundation coming upon Bagdad gave victory to the Sultan; but scarcely was it achieved, when it transpired that the Pasha of Egypt was rebellious. In 1832 a new war from this quarter was visibly arising. All the Arab tribes of Mesopotamia were brought

up by the Pasha, and the communication with Bagdad across the desert was stopped. The exhaustion of the Sultan was so great, that for several years no considerable effort could be made. All Syria fell beneath the Pasha of Egypt, and at length in a decisive battle the Sultan's army was beaten. The Emperor Nicolas saw his opportunity. He had crushed the Sultan, and had so laid his plans as to secure that Turkish independence should be nominal. In 1840, he offered to the Sultan his military aid to subdue the refractory Pasha of Egypt. It is remarkable that in 1853 he claimed credit with Sir Hamilton Seymour (Feb. 21), saying: 'I, and I only, hastened to the assistance of the Sultan, when his dominions were threatened by the Pasha of Egypt.' But the English Ministry of that day (1840) looked on such aid as an utterly ruinous obligation, and in the recess of Parliament suddenly entered on the Syrian war—a policy attributed to Lord Palmerston peculiarly, who then was Foreign Secretary. Our fleet and marines, with a few Turkish troops, drove Ibrahim Pasha out of Syria, and threatened attack on Alexandria also, hereby forcing his father, Mohammed Pasha of Egypt, to make peace with the Sultan. No other justification of this war was talked of, except that it was necessary to save the Sultan from owing his throne and his safety to the gift and grace of Nicolas. It was purely a war of surprise to the nation and the Parliament, and nearly flung us into conflict with France. Whatever may be said against our Ministers, it is clear that the Emperor was aiming solely to make the Sultan his mere satrap, even if Quakers cannot see it.

Five years passed, and in 1845 the Emperor came in person to London, in order to converse privately with the Duke of Welling-

ton and Sir Robert Peel on the affairs of Turkey. He then deposited with our Ministry a paper on the subject, which was made a great secret in the successive Cabinets, until it was published in 1854. The questions which, if discussed at all, it would have opened, were too dangerous for any English statesman to touch; so they all pretended not to understand it; a conventional course for which no Quaker will much blame them: but in reality they kept their eyes open, though painfully aware how arduous was the task of checking Russian ambition. Up to this time, the English public took no alarm.

But in 1848 the revolutions in Paris, in Berlin, in Vienna, and in all Germany effectually roused the English mind to a new and intense interest in foreign affairs. It is necessary to dwell a little on these events, if we would understand why the English felt to the centre of their hearts that Russia must be checked in her course of violent ambition. In that wonderful year 1848 petitions were carried up to Constantinople from the two Danubian principalities for enlarged and more liberal local institutions. The Sultan at once and willingly granted the request, and the delegates returned with joy. But on hearing this, Nicolas sent an army and occupied Moldavia; the Sultan replied by occupying Wallachia with an army under Fuad Pasha. But he had to avert war by a great humiliation. Nicolas insisted on his retracting his concessions and banishing the most eminent of the delegates! Even so, his army remained in Moldavia, and presently made it a sallypost for war against Transylvania, because of great events in Hungary. At the end of that year, some acquaintance with the Hungarian commotions leaked out in England, though the

details were not understood by us clearly until February or March of the next year. The Austrian dynasty, having attained dominion in many kingdoms by royal marriages, had annihilated constitutional rule by perfidy and violence in every one of them except in Hungary, where, defeated or temporarily successful in a long series of perfidious and sanguinary wars, it was in every single reign glaringly unfaithful to vital points of the coronation oath, and regardless of the protests of the Hungarian Parliament. The grievances had united the vast majority of the nation in a determination to insist on a faithful fulfilment of the constitutional law and of the personal contract, which, before the coronation, every king had to sign; and from (at latest) 1843 onward the patriots by steady peaceful pressure moved towards their strictly constitutional goal. Ferdinand of Austria, then their King, was of an intellect manifestly imperfect. An Austrian ministry worked the State-machine without responsibility; for the Hungarian Parliament could not call them to account. The Hungarians insisted on a responsible ministry. At last in 1848 the revolution in Vienna itself brought more liberal Austrians into power and terrified the dynastic unscrupulous 'Camarilla;' so that the King was permitted by his Austrian advisers solemnly to accept from the Hungarian Parliament the cardinal laws of Reform, April 15. All Hungary was in jubilee, and Ferdinand became highly popular. But before this, the Austrian Camarilla of the palace, with the Palatine (or Viceroy) of Hungary, the Archduke Stephen,—whose official duty was to protect Hungary and its constitution from usurpations by the King,—had been perfidiously plotting a bloody reaction. On the

very day on which the Austrians had first yielded (March 15) Jellachich was appointed by them Ban (Duke?) of Croatia, who forthwith began to organise revolt against Hungary, so openly that the Emperor's Austrian advisers could not resist the remonstrances of Count Batthyanyi, the new Premier of Hungary, but publicly denounced Jellachich as a rebel. The Archduke Stephen exhorted the Hungarian Diet to raise an army against him; yet the Austrians secretly supplied him with money, arms, and officers. At the same time they raised levies of Servians at Belgrade, stimulated the Austrian Serbs to rebel, who burnt Hungarian villages and perpetrated indiscriminate slaughter. Presently an edict from Austria reinstated Jellachich in all his dignities, and forbade the Hungarian levies; Jellachich crossed the Drave with an army into Hungary, declaring there should be no peace until a ministry at Vienna ruled over Hungarian affairs. He was nevertheless ignominiously defeated by an extemporised Hungarian army, and despatches from him were intercepted, in which he thanked the Austrian Ministry for supplies of money and material of war. Captive officers fighting for the Croats and Serbs were found to bear the Austrian commission. Jellachich, when defeated, took refuge with an Austrian army, and immediately a Royal Rescript (October 3) illegally dissolved the Hungarian Parliament, forbade all municipal action, superseded the judicial tribunals, declared Hungary to be under martial law, and appointed Jellachich Civil and Military Governor of that country, with discretionary power of life and death, and an expressly unlimited despotism. Out of this scandalous tissue of bloody and perfidious usurpation the war

of Hungary against Austria arose. Yet it did not aim at separation; in the earlier stage it aimed only to re-establish legality; the war was at first carried on in the name of King Ferdinand. But when the King understood that things had reached this crisis, he had enough intellect to become restive to his ministers. Hereupon they induced him to abdicate (though the document was never shown), and set up his nephew, a youth of eighteen, as emperor and king over Hungary, without cognisance of its Parliament or any constitutional ceremony.

The Austrians invaded Hungary from nine points, and poured in 150,000 men; yet the war was disastrous and ignominious to them. In the month of March 1849 the Hungarians defeated them in seven great battles in the open field. They were driven into full retreat for Vienna; but the Emperor Nicolas had engaged to support them, if necessary. He knew that by giving his aid effectually he would make Austria his humble servant; therefore, without the least remorse at taking up so disgracefully bad a cause, he interfered with all his might. The English Government, early in the struggle, was officially requested by the Governor of Hungary to resume the character of *Mediator*, which, with Holland, it had borne in 1710, when the Two Maritime Powers negotiated the peace of Szatmar between Hungary and Austria; but our Ministers were afraid that it might implicate us in a war with Russia, and therefore refused. France followed the example of England, the Germans wished success to Austria, and Turkey did not dare to recognise the belligerence of Hungary, even when she was victorious over Austria. Hence Hungary was disabled from purchasing arms of the Turks, upon

whom it is to be feared that the heavy hand of both England and France was then laid, sternly to forbid it as a breach of International Law. Nothing but arms were wanted by Hungary to add 100,000 staunch men to their army; but they had no great workshops, and arms could not be made fast enough. Despair seized many of the Hungarian officers, when it became notorious that Russia was hastening to the aid of Austria; and Görgey, the general-in-chief, fancied himself patriotic in acting the traitor. By this circumstance alone the Russian arms were victorious and Hungary was crushed.

These events made a profound impression on the English nation. As soon as it was known that Russia was about to send her armies to the aid of Austria, meetings of sympathy with Hungary became universal; but our Ministry, however clear-sighted as to Russian designs, were timid in the extreme. In a formal despatch Lord Palmerston stated that he had no word of remark to make. A debate took place in Parliament concerning the Russian intervention, and the same noble lord delivered what was called his Hungarian speech, in which he reflected strongly on Austrian un wisdom, but did not allude at all to Russia, that is, to the real question before Parliament. It can hardly be doubted that the Ministry was paralysed by dread of a Russian war; but by this very timidity they brought the war nearer. Even in 1848, when the Russian army occupied Moldavia (the Sultan's territory), whence it advanced into Transylvania to assist the Austrians, Lord Palmerston would not protest, but accepted the Russian ambassador's false pretence, that the general had acted without orders from St. Petersburg. How any Quaker can imagine that the noble lord *desired* a war with

Russia, it is difficult to understand.

But the English nation took these events deeply to heart, and when at length in the autumn of 1851 Kossuth, the chosen Governor of Hungary, came to England, he was received with honours fully royal. Rich and poor vied in the display of sympathy. The rich men of the City of London, of Birmingham, of Manchester, of Edinburgh, of Glasgow, were eager to welcome him. Only Whig and Tory officials and those who had a deep stake in Austrian funds, shunned or insulted him. Our people, however vague their knowledge, knew that Hungary was a united people contending bravely and successfully for hereditary law and liberty against a perjured Crown, but crushed in the middle of their success by the Russian invasion. Germany at that time had no central authority. Few German princes dared to utter publicly any word displeasing to Russia. Austria was virtually a Russian dependency, for she had become so hated in Hungary that Nicolas could at any moment rouse Hungary to insurrection by a few moderate promises. Thus the indirect power of Russia was felt as far as the Rhine. With exiles from the Continent it was a familiar remark: 'The next great war will be a general war against Russia, without which there can be no security for law or freedom.' Such was the ferment of intense indignation through England at that time. Not much short of 140 municipalities sent solemn invitations of compliment to the Hungarian leader; but all this was suddenly interrupted by a startling event—the Prince President's *coup d'état* in France.

The establishment of despotism in France was a violent check to all hopes of an early recovery for Hungary or Italy. Napoleon had already set his heel on Rome.

Three emperors had successfully crushed liberty; and England began to tremble for herself. Early in 1852 a strange panic ran through London. French colonels and at least one general were eager for an invasion of England. French exiles insisted that Louis Napoleon was planning to reconcile the French to his usurped power by wiping off the disgrace of Waterloo. Rumour reiterated that an armament at Cherbourg was preparing for an expedition against our shores. An utterance of the Earl of Ellesmere was given to the public, that if the French army entered London at one end, the Guards would march out at the other. Eminent foreigners were astonished at the cowardice and dismay of the Londoners. One of them said to the present writer, 'We think that if a French army landed here, not one would escape with his life but as prisoner of war.' Yet even Parliament was frightened, and without any dissent voted 600,000*l.* to build a fleet of screw steamers (an entirely new thing) for defence against Louis Napoleon, Joseph Hume himself going round to implore the members not to talk or delay, and especially not to irritate Napoleon while our defences were so imperfect. The fleet was built with all speed against France, but its first use was to sail in conjunction with the French fleet against Russia.

It cannot be doubted that the Emperor Nicolas saw with satisfaction the violent suspicion of France which had come over us, and made sure that an alliance of England and France against him was impossible. Another acute statesman saw events from his own point of view, and distinctly foreknew the conduct of Nicolas. Kossuth had gladly accepted the invitation of the American Republic to visit their soil, and went through all the principal states, fêted by

them and haranguing them. His object was to secure, that in any new war of Hungary against Austria they would acknowledge Hungary as belligerent, and would insist on a right of commerce with her on equal terms as with other belligerents. On May 14, 1852, in an elaborate speech on the Condition of Europe—his last speech in Boston—Kossuth avowed that an attack from Russia on Turkey impended, it might be this year or even this month. So in his speech on Russia and the Balance of Power, at Syracuse, in New York State. Russia aims, he says, partly at direct conquest and partly at sovereign preponderance. 'Protectorate' is her first step to conquest. She has started the idea of Panslavism, or the union of all Slaves under Russian protectorate. If she can achieve this, they really fall under her dominion; and a slight knowledge of geography shows that such a mass united under one man's despotic will must make the independence of Europe a mockery. Nicolas, having made Austria dependent on him, has got his opportunity against Turkey. The war was imminent and inevitable, for Russia could not afford to wait, since she knew Turkey was growing stronger every day, Servia being contented, the Turks in closer mutual union, and the armaments better equipped and trained. The great vigour which they presently exhibited in the Crimean War, and the astonishing excellence of their artillery, fully justified his panegyric. Servia offered 80,000 men to aid the Porte, but Austrian armies forced her to keep them at home for her own defence.

English Ministers saw as clearly as Kossuth the intentions of Nicolas, but they had no such right of free speech. The recent publication of Lord Palmerston's life and letters

enables us now to state as positive fact that of which it was always unreasonable to doubt. In this matter we may be allowed to quote somewhat freely from his letters, when they will illustrate our topic. Sir Hamilton Seymour, our ambassador at St. Petersburg, behaved with great politeness to the Emperor, but he certainly kept his eyes open. In the autumn of 1852 Nicolas and Francis Joseph held several secret meetings, in which Sir Hamilton believed that some concert against Turkey had been planned. It was soon after the Aberdeen Ministry was formed in 1853 that Nicolas began to unbosom himself to Sir Hamilton. Their secret conversations were not intended to see the light, yet were published, in consequence of a challenge from St. Petersburg, about fourteen months later. Sir Hamilton had already notified to his Government that Nicolas had ordered the march of 144,000 men to the frontier of the Danubian provinces, a fact which doubtless aided him to interpret the smooth phrases of the Emperor; but Mr. Richard (and the Quakers in general perhaps) accept these phrases as veritable truth. A diplomatist, however clear-sighted he may be, thinks it his duty to be polite, and dares not be exactly honest, where honesty would be accounted insult. Sir Hamilton nevertheless discharged his difficult duty irreproachably. Only Lord John Russell seems to have gone beyond the mark in trying to soothe the Emperor by an extravagant compliment, which Mr. Richard again interprets as literal truth. Each Foreign Secretary (at first Lord John Russell, presently Lord Clarendon) evidently thought only how to avoid complicity in spoliation, when the Emperor offered to England Egypt and Candia as their share in the division of Turkey. A positive refusal to accept had to be accom-

panied with courtly compliment, not with open indignation; but Quakers, accustomed to blunt truth, apparently cannot understand this posture.

Equally remote from Lord Aberdeen's thought was war to assist Turkey. Singlehanded, he thought us unequal to conduct a conflict with Russia to a stable peace. Alliance with France appeared impossible. The French army in Rome was an offence to us, and Lord Aberdeen hated the idea of a French army in Constantinople. Besides, French armies only recently had terrified us with a threat of invasion. We abhorred Louis Napoleon for his perfidious and bloody *coup d'état*, and he had very recently been so misbehaving himself at Constantinople as to draw forth from our Government censures and protests. This Prince had been elected President of the Republic by favour of the French clergy, to whom he made secret promises. He repaid them by restoring the Pope to the throne from which he had fled, and sustaining him on it by French arms, and yet failed to earn their gratitude. He further tried to win them by striving for a supremacy of the Latin Church in the Holy Land.

Of this Mr. Richard gives a careful account, showing how imperious was the French ambassador Lavalette, what new concessions he demanded for the glorification of the Latin Church, to the displeasure of the Greek patriarch, and how he sent a French ship of war to Constantinople, and further threatened that a French fleet should appear off Jaffa and a French army occupy Jerusalem and appropriate all the sanctuaries. By doing this, he unawares played the game of Russia, and gave her the plea that if the Porte was to be pressed so hard by France, Russia must press and threaten also, in order to keep the

balance even. Besides, by forcing English Ministers to take part against France, it made an appearance to the Emperor Nicolas as if we were quietly and effectually playing into his hand. In fact, our Ministry totally disapproved of his doctrine that Russia and England should settle the affairs of Turkey between them, regarding Austria as absorbed in Russia, France as virtually hostile, and Prussia out of the question. It is justly claimed as highly honourable to the British Ministry that so ample a secret correspondence should have nothing that the country can blush to avow. Would that in other things we were as blameless! That we were too complimentary in our substantial rejection of the Emperor's overtures is the worst that can be said. It is believed that Nicolas, thus failing with us, addressed himself soon after to Louis Napoleon, but with as little success.

Colonel Rose, the deputy of our ambassador at Constantinople, took alarm at Prince Menchikoff's insulting tone and new demands, after the quarrel of Russia and France about the holy places was settled. He therefore summoned Admiral Dundas to bring up the British fleet from Malta to a shorter distance, Besika Bay; but the Admiral refused to obey, and our Ministry justified his refusal. Lord Palmerston seems to have regretted this; but he was at that crisis Home Secretary, and bore no further responsibility for foreign affairs than did every member of the Cabinet; but he cordially approved alike of Lord John Russell and of Lord Clarendon in the post of Foreign Secretary. On May 22, 1853, before the Russian army had crossed the Pruth, he wrote the following to Lord Clarendon: 'The Russia Government has always had two strings to its bow—moderate language and disinterested professions

at Petersburg and London; active aggression by its agents on the scene of operations. If the aggressions succeed locally, the Petersburg Government adopts them as a *fait accompli* which it did not intend, but cannot in honour recede from. If the local agents fail, they are disavowed and recalled, and the language previously held is appealed to as a proof that the agents have overstepped their instructions although no human being with two ideas in his head could doubt that they had acted under specific instructions.' Thus it is clear that he understood the subtle hypocrisy of their entrance into Transylvania, though he would not tell Parliament so. The whole Ministry, indeed, understood Nicolas, but they were very slow to be convinced that some overt act was needed to show him that their remonstrances were not feigned and hollow.

The English fleet at length anchored in Besika Bay on June 15.

Mr. Richard goes so far as to say that this was as bad as the occupation of Jassi by the Russians! Our fleet simply came *nearer* to Constantinople that it might be closer to the Sultan at call. The Sultan had a perfect right to invite it, even into the Golden Horn. We had a right, moreover, had it been against his will, to go to the outside of the Dardanelles. But let Lord Palmerston reply to Mr. Richard. On July 12 he wrote: 'The Russian Government has been led on step by step by the apparent timidity of the Government of England. Reports artfully propagated that the British Cabinet declared it would have *la paix à tout prix* have not been sufficiently contradicted by overt acts. The result has been that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, not content with bullying Turkey, threatens and insults England and France, and arrogantly pretends to forbid

the ships of war of those Powers from frequenting the waters of another Power, over whose waters Russia has no authority whatever, and who *has invited* their ships into those waters specifically to *protect it* against Russian aggression. It is the robber who declares that he will not leave the house until the policeman shall first have retired from the courtyard.' Such being the plain and certain state of facts, Mr. Richard wonderfully sides with the Russian pretence. Lord Palmerston, at the Home Office, cannot have read the despatch sent out to the admirals, written by Drouyn de Lhuys, French Foreign Secretary, and countersigned by Lord Clarendon: In due time it saw the light in a Blue Book, and alas! it informed the admirals that they were *not* sent out to fight against the Emperor of Russia, *but to save the Sultan from religious enthusiasm, and from fatal auxiliaries.* Probably this duplicity was the critical fact which implicated us in the war. 'Religious enthusiasm' was the diplomatic phrase for Turkish patriotism, which of course took a religious colour; but concerning this Lord Palmerston writes a little later (November 1): 'I take the fanaticism which has been aroused [in the Turks] to be the fanaticism which consists in a burning indignation at a national insult, and a daring impatience to expel an invading enemy. I have no partiality for the Turks as Mahometans; but I am well convinced that there are a vast number of Christians under the Governments of Russia, Austria, Rome, and Naples, who would rejoice to be as well treated, and to enjoy as much security for persons and property, as the Christian subjects of the Sultan.' Mr. Richard may seem to know nothing of the cruel persecutions, religious and political, which at that time were going on

under the express cognisance and command of these four Christian powers. Very aptly, also, Lord Palmerston wrote on September 21 to Sidney Herbert: 'What is it that the Emperor wants? Why will he not plainly tell us? Does he want merely *what all of us want*, viz. that the Christians in the Turkish Empire shall be safe from oppression, vexation, and injury? If that is what he wants, *let him begin by himself setting the example.* Let him, by evacuating the Principalities, relieve the Christian inhabitants of *that* part of the Turkish Empire from the complicated and various miseries which the occupation of their country by a Russian army inflicts upon them.' A short space later, when the Turkish victories expelled the Russians, the Christian population eagerly welcomed the Turks as deliverers. In the war of 1828-9, the Principalities suffered great oppression from the Russians. Unhappily, it is not only Mussulman rule which is truculent, bigoted, and unjust. Lord Palmerston warmly approved the principle of putting any Christian population which was oppressed by Turkey under the *joint* protection of the Five Great Powers; but for Turks to confer a Protectorate by treaty to the 'quibbling and pettifogging Government' of Russia, was merely to give it a pretext for constant interference with a view to ultimate conquest.

Mr. Richard is angry that the Turks, finding the Emperor obstinate in holding the two Danubian Principalities in his cruel grasp—provinces which it was their official duty to protect—at length declared war a quarter of a year later, against the advice of the English ambassador. If Napoleon I. had claimed to protect the Irish Catholics from the Protestant rule of England, and, failing to extort from us a treaty by argument, had occu-

pied the city of Bristol as 'a material guarantee' to enable him to negotiate to advantage, we all know beforehand that Quakers would bid us submit to it. But as it would be unreasonable for them to scold us for acting on our own principles, not on theirs, so it would be monstrous in us English to censure the Turks for accepting the war which Nicolas forced upon them. No doubt our ambassador was angry at it; the more so if, as Mr. Richard believes, his influence had aroused their war spirit; but that had become clear to *them* before October, which Lord Palmerston wrote to Lord John Russell as early as July 7, that the course which Nicolas 'had pursued, from his first overtures for a partition of Turkey, and especially the violent, abusive, and menacing language of his last manifesto, seem to show that he has taken his line, and that nothing will satisfy him but complete submission on the part of Turkey. We ought, therefore, not to disguise from ourselves that he is bent on a stand-up fight.' Indeed, as said above, he began negotiations by sending 144,000 men to the Turkish frontier.

But we do not yet touch the bottom of diplomacy. The Turks had had abundant warning that Austria would take part with Russia, though they had not read the secret correspondence. Seeing then that England and France vacillated and were quite untrustworthy, they found no escape from the double war, and in self-defence determined to rouse Hungary against Austria if it came upon them. This, above all things, the English Cabinet dreaded; for the doctrine was traditional with them, that a strong Austria was a necessary defence against Russia. Unhappily they

had been blind in 1848 and 1849 to the fact that Austria could not be strong while Hungary was in enmity with her, and that their first duty was to mediate and reconcile the combatants, ere too late. Perhaps future time may disclose that the Baron Stockmar and Prince Albert were the fatal impediment to this righteous, wise, and obvious course: but the Coalition Ministry persevered in the policy of the Whig Ministry, of keeping down Hungary under the foot of Austria. Lord Stratford by his spies had discovered the intended alliance of the Sultan with the Hungarians, who are the 'fatal auxiliaries' denounced in the letter to the admirals. Thus the fleet was sent, not *really* to defend the Sultan, but to dangle before his eyes the hope that we might *possibly* defend him; lest, if he despair of being helped by us, and Austria make sure that we should not fight, Austria become an open ally of Russia, and Turkey ally herself to Hungary. Lord Stratford went so far as to break through all constitutional proprieties, and getting an audience of the Sultan without any cognisance of the Sultan's ministers,³ extorted from him a promise that if Kossuth should arrive at Constantinople when summoned by the Seraskier to sign the treaty, the Sultan would forthwith imprison him. While the protection of our fleet was a sham, our ambassador nevertheless introduced the admiral and officers in solemn divan to the Sultan, as 'sent to protect him from unjustifiable aggression.' By this duplicity our Ministry brought the war on themselves. When the massacre at Sinopè by the Russian ships took place, indescribable shame possessed both the Western Powers. From the beginning they had only damaged

³ For this assertion the writer is personally responsible, knowing the fact through Kossuth's private communications with the Turkish minister.

the Turks. They had hindered their saving Wallachia in the first instance from the grasp of Russia; they had held the hands of the Turks from expelling the invader; they had pressed on the Sultan a Vienna note which contained words of dangerous import. The Turks saw the danger, and desired to make small verbal changes, to which the English and French ambassadors saw no possible objection, but Russia fiercely rejected the changes as of cardinal importance; thus demonstrating that the Turks were right (though Mr. Richard is blind to the argument), and that their allies, in eagerness for peace, were leading them into a trap. When they tried to do without our aid, by allying themselves with Hungary (as they had a perfect right to do, if Austria joined the war against them) we vehemently forbade them. Finally we sent two fleets ostensibly to defend them, and did not defend them.

The two Western Powers were fully conscious how dastardly it would seem after this to withdraw and leave Turkey to her fate,—perhaps to be divided between Russia and Austria, to say nothing of other contingencies; but the nearer they came to war, the more anxious were they to be quite sure that they had done everything in their power to avert it. As a last effort, the Emperor of the French, on January 29, 1854, wrote with his own hand a simple, respectful, almost a touching letter to the Emperor Nicolas, in the earnest desire to obviate so great a calamity. Mr. Richard totally omits to mention this very important letter. Not to impute this to an unfair purpose, one is forced to suppose that partisanship of Russia blinded him. He tells us that Nicolas is proved by the secret correspondence to have desired earnestly the friendship and alliance of England. No one doubts,

or ever doubted, that he desired to make England his accomplice in partitioning Turkey, into which he tried to entice us. Our very complimentary refusal persuaded him that he would never have to meet armed opposition from us: he plunged boldly on under this conviction; hence, when it broke upon him that our compliments meant nothing or little, he was highly incensed, and was too proud to recede. Louis Napoleon plainly sets forth the sense of shame which then oppressed the two Western Powers. 'France and England (says he) had not thought it necessary to send troops to the assistance of Turkey; their flag, therefore, was not engaged in the conflicts which took place upon the land. But at sea it was very different. There were at the entrance of the Bosphorus 3,000 guns, *proclaiming loudly to Turkey* that the two leading maritime Powers would not allow her to be attacked by sea. The affair at Sinopé was for us as painful as it was unexpected. . . . The Turkish vessels were destroyed *in spite of the assurance* [given them by us?] that there was no wish [in your Majesty's heart] to commence an aggressive war, and in spite of the nearness of our squadrons. It was no longer our policy which received a check: *it was our military honour*. The sound of the cannon-shot at Sinopé reverberated painfully in the hearts of all those who in England and in France respect national dignity. . . .' But the Emperor of the French proceeds with the most delicate respect to point out how a peaceful conclusion may still be reached. 'What could be simpler than to declare that an armistice shall now be signed; *that things shall resume their diplomatic course*; that all hostilities shall cease; and that the belligerent forces shall return from the places to which motives of war have led

them? Thus the Russian troops would abandon the Principalities, and our squadrons the Black Sea. Your Majesty, preferring to treat directly with Turkey, might appoint an ambassador, who could negotiate with a plenipotentiary of the Sultan a convention which might be submitted to a conference of the Four Powers. Let your Majesty adopt this plan, upon which the Queen of England and myself are perfectly agreed: tranquillity will be established and the world satisfied. There is nothing in the plan which is unworthy of your Majesty; nothing which can wound your honour; &c., &c. . . . It is difficult to understand how, after reading this letter, anyone can doubt that both of the Western Powers were sincerely anxious to evade the war, or that the Emperor of Russia could not even in that stage have receded from it with dignity;—but a fanatical pride forbade it, and goaded him on. Mr. Richard imputes fanaticism to the Turkish nation for bravely doing their duty in expelling the invader: the English public, he also says, 'was at that time *the prey of a fanaticism no less fierce and far more inexcusable than that of the Turks.* A frantic and irrational hatred of Russia pervaded the public mind and was fanned by the press, the platform, and, alas! by the pulpit.' He is very wrong in saying a 'hatred' of Russia; nay, but a deep conviction that the Russian Emperor was the deadly and dangerous enemy to all constitutional freedom and all secure national law. It is well that Mr. Richard confesses the unanimity of England; which was quite unexampled in this century. The nation was beforehand in the firm conviction that Russia must be checked in her career of aggression. It was quite unable to push the Cabinet on; but when the war at length was entered, the nation

shrank from no sacrifices, was steady and immovable both when the worst mismanagement at Balaklava pierced our hearts, and when Lord John Russell, dismayed to find that the alliance of Austria, which he had fondly hoped to gain by pernicious concessions, could no way at all be won, recommended to make peace on the Russian terms. In adversity equally as in the opening of the war, our nation was calm and persistent; no part of the community grumbled at the war-taxes. It was no fanaticism, no irrational frenzy, but a fixed conviction, a sound instinct of danger. We wanted to make it our last war with Russia; and certainly for two generations we have had no superfluous war-spirit. On the universality of it Lord Palmerston writes (in a private letter) thus, January 24, 1856, on the eve of the conclusion of peace: 'The British nation is unanimous in this matter. I say, unanimous; for I cannot reckon Cobden, Bright and Co. for anything. Even if the Government were not kept straight by a sense of our public duty, the strong feeling which prevails throughout the country would make it impossible for us to swerve.' Such was the noble and brave constancy of our nation which the Quakers think they now have a right to insult; of which also most of the younger generation, ignorant of the facts, learn to be ashamed when they hear the perpetual cry that 'twenty to twenty-five years ago we were fanatical and frenzied' raised by men who pass like condemnation on every war, defensive as well as offensive: men who, however wise and good and estimable in most things, hold up as a Divine truth the intolerable paradox that if a troop of pirates were to land on our shores and slay, plunder, burn, and ravish indiscriminately, our duty would be to suffer it unresist-

ingly, and on no account to meet violence with violence. They further pretend that the Crimean War has gained nothing. It has certainly gained too little—first, because of the astonishing errors and mismanagements which we committed; secondly, by reason of the very reprehensible perfidy of the Russian Government, in repudiating in 1870 the terms by which it was glad to buy peace in 1856. Such conduct teaches nations to distrust one another, and drives them to exact extreme material guarantees when solemn engagements (*ἔρκος φοβερός*) cease to bind. Yet perhaps, after all, a Russian fleet in the Black Sea can no longer harm Europe, who is now fortified in the East by a strong German Empire and by an Austria reconciled to her subjects. Hungary now at length esteems Austria, not as a dangerous foe, but as a valuable bulwark against the Slaves. But in short, from 1814, when Napoleon was sent to Elba, until 1856, when peace was imposed on Russia, everything went on *worse* and *worse*, without even hope of improvement, in Spain, Sicily, Italy, Hungary, Germany (except so far as a sternly sagacious Prussia moderated), and finally in Russia herself. But from 1856 to this day everything has become gradually better in all these countries; or, at least, there is rational hope of improvement, even for Spain and Sicily.⁴ Poland, alas!—which the Western Allies did not dare to befriend in the Crimean War—has perished; and the great experiment of making Turk and Christian equal before the law has signally failed in Turkey. Mr. Gladstone confessed that by espousing the Sultan's

cause in the Crimean War we incurred a responsibility towards the Christian subjects of Turkey, inasmuch as we necessarily aided to sustain Turkish rule. But it is utterly untrue that we entered the war *solely* to sustain Turkish rule: it was to sustain the great principle that *the frontier lines of every Power are under the guarantee of the collective Powers*. The Quaker doctrine teaches that every ambitious Power is to be allowed to encroach on its neighbour when it can and as it pleases, whence must come universal confusion and a new Dark Age. The OBJECT of the English people in the war was *to forbid Russian aggression*; that Turkey was then the State to be protected was a mere accident. Ministers, of course, used the diplomatic formula, 'protection of Turkey,' as less offensive and irritating to Russia than to inscribe on their flag that the repression of Russia was their object, which must have made the resumption of amity more difficult. Yet Lord Palmerston in Parliament, on August 7, 1855, said that 'the objects of the war were wider than could depend on the decision of the Turkish Government. The protection of Turkey was a means to an end. Behind the protection of Turkey was the *greater* question of repressing the grasping ambition of Russia, and *preventing the extinction of political and commercial liberty*. The Governments of France and England had as great, or even greater, interest than Turkey in the conditions of the future peace of Europe.' History furnishes no instance in which an ambitious Power, successful in conquest, has been arrested by anything but disasters in war. Ancient Rome, Germany, Spain,

⁴ It is urged by our assailants that our Crimean War strengthened Turkey against her Christian subjects: as if the secondary results of any wise conduct could always be desirable. The emancipation of the Russian serfs, an unforeseen result, is a set-off against things unforeseen on the other side. But in the Danubian Principalities Russia had three times been worse than Turkey.

Austria, France, England, Russia, and the Slave Power of America, all needed severe lessons by unsuccessful war. Van Amburgh found that lions were unsusceptible of moral training until their skulls were well battered with an iron rod. Such is every ambitious conquering Power. Russia has learned not to encounter European war; and she has now a most important and difficult task in taming the Independent Tartars. Now also we may need her to protect the Asiatic Christians, whom we cannot reach, from possible Turkish bigotry. Here lies one danger of the present. If Christendom seem to the Asiatic Turks to be making crusade against the Crescent, no moral power will remain in the Sultan to restrain the fanatical

hatred of Christians which may be aroused in Asia. Above all therefore we must show that we are not coming to the rescue of Bulgaria or Montenegro because the people are Christians (indeed, of the Montenegrin Christianity the specimens are not encouraging); nor are we bent on acting against Ottoman rule barely because the Ottomans are Moslems. The more *judicial* the proceedings of the Six Great Powers, the more beneficial will be their operation. Nay, it may be hoped that at this crisis the basis may be laid for an International Tribunal which shall mediate authoritatively in the future quarrels of European States. If this end can be won, the present affliction may become an auspicious beginning of a wiser and happier conjunction.

* * The initials—L.-A.—of the Author of 'Barbados' in our August Number were accidentally omitted at the end of the article.

