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IN the speculations of current political literature no more prevalent error among the well-informed strikes us, than the involuntary assumption that interest will prevail over passion in the actions of great States. This may be true where there is no one pervading passion; where impulse is set against impulse, and common interest is, though a weaker, yet an ever-acting power: but otherwise, it is no more true with Imperial dynasties, as Russia and Austria, than with the American democracy. In America itself the press of New York has for years back consoled itself with the erroneous belief that however the Slave-states might bluster, and however the Garrisonian abolitionists might rave, common interest in the mighty and glorious UNION would make civil war or separation impossible. Local conflict, as at Kansas, soon to be pacified by the Federal forces, was the utmost of disorder which their fond speculations admitted to blot the peaceful and agreeable prospect. In fact, every American of the States whom we have met treated it as a mere result of local ignorance when Englishmen prognosticated that the quarrel of free and slave labour would never be settled without civil war. Strange as the assertion may at first seem, we are disposed to think it true, that in many great political questions close and minute knowledge is unfavourable to sound judgment. The fresh eye of a spectator from without catches broad facts and discerns great silent currents, which by their steady continuous action escape those who are borne on in the midst of them. The *proportions* of events, as of mountains, are better discerned by those who do

not live in the midst of them. A physician who has too long seen his patient from day to day—and we will add, has seen no other patients—less keenly discerns his true state than does the equally intelligent eye of a stranger.

To the English speculator on the United States, we believe no phenomenon has been more prominent, than that which their own Emerson publicly proclaimed, immediately after the brutal attack on Charles Sumner had called forth echoes of applause from the South. By that whole affair the fact was brought out into terrible prominence, that the temper of the South is essentially barbarous. 'Barbarism and civilization,' said Emerson (we quote the substance of his words by memory only), 'cannot coalesce to work a free constitution.' The recent conduct of the South is in so striking analogy to the dynastic usurpations of Europe in its pretensions and justification, as instructively to show despotism as the spiritual essence of the pretended democracy. A king who has received a legitimate throne that he may be the honoured guardian and enforcer of the laws, finds that his Parliament, in the exercise of its legitimate functions, is something else than his tool or plaything. It will *not* vote money for something which he desires; or it *will* censure a corrupt or lawless minister. Hereupon the king overthrows the constitution by violence, and justifies himself by saying that he found the Parliament unmanageable. Such has been the uniform course of European usurpations: and what of American? The Southern States, for a series of years, had been accustomed to find their own favourite candidate win

in the Presidential elections: at length their candidate is defeated, and forthwith they break up the very foundation of the State, scorning to remain in it at all if they are ever to be outvoted. Clearer demonstration could not be offered of the absolute impossibility of North and South (even if the present quarrel be temporarily patched up) working a free constitution peaceably in common. The South has evidently not one spark of that vital principle of free communities which Mr. Grote has named *Constitutional Morality*. The moment the slave-party is beaten by voting, it betakes itself to violence, treason, and revolt. Mr. Seward, in his great speech on the secession, avowed that he did not know what would be the value to the Union of States forced by civil war to return to it. With equal pertinence one may ask, what will be their value to the Union if they are won back by such concessions to their petulance and lawlessness as Mr. Seward declared himself willing to give?

In the history of republics it is easy to see to what crisis these events are analogous. They are to the American Union what the fatal feud of aristocracy and democracy was to the small republics of Greece and of middle age Italy; and again, what the quarrel of Marius and Sulla was to Rome. Of course in the modern controversy there is the marked distinction, and the auspicious advantage, that the opponents are not locally mingled on the very same area, so as to entail the worst dangers of civil war. Nevertheless, the possession of magistracy and its results, power and family wealth, are the prize of contest with the Southerners, as with the Greek or Italian nobles. Here, as there, an aristocracy accustomed to regard office as its natural right, struggles to retain it by unscrupulous violence, if legally outvoted. But we do not draw the fatal omen which the comparison might suggest; for in the modern struggle a

higher spiritual principle is involved. This is no mere scramble of reciprocal and equal selfishness; but it is a combat in which the violators of the Union, who are also actual and treacherous aggressors, are avowed patrons and glorifiers of an accursed form of slavery; while their opponents, whatever mixture of party spirit or other human weakness may be ascribed to them, are undoubtedly champions of human freedom, some broadly and consciously, the rest by desiring to put some limit to the extending pestilence. That between elements so intensely opposed hostile conflict should arise, we can scarcely regret. The only thing to be desired is, that the conflict shall take as little desolating a character as circumstances admit.

It is a well-known remark of Thucydides, that in the civil contests familiar to him, the more daring and unscrupulous men generally prevailed over the intelligent and more moderate, who fell victims to violence while they were deliberating; perhaps while they were studying schemes of pacification and comprehension. But these were little city-states, with none of the happy stability enjoyed by our great communities, to which no sudden attack can be fatal except from the executive government, which has in its own hand the entire military organization. The American Union appears nevertheless to have really had a narrow escape through the irresolution of its President, who proved not to have enough of the dare-devil in him for the work which others were anxious to put upon him—men to whom he gave the reins almost up to the verge of treason. Three cabinet ministers are such open offenders that we suppose no defence of them from a European is possible. Cobb of Georgia found in the treasury a surplus of forty million dollars, and left it bankrupt. Floyd, of the war department,* se-

* Since this was written we see it stated that Mr. Floyd 'indignantly denies' these charges. If he can show that the arms have not vanished, it will, no doubt, bring much satisfaction.

cretly stripped the strong Southern fortresses of their garrisons, so that the insurgents might be able to seize them, as they have done. He moreover secretly transferred southward from the northern arsenals more than two hundred thousand stand of arms, and sold to those who were planning secession twenty-five thousand excellent muskets for two dollars and a half apiece, which had cost the treasury about fourteen dollars each. A nephew of this man, a clerk in the department of the Interior, stole eight hundred thousand dollars from the fund appropriated to defence against the wild tribes called Indians. Another minister—Thompson, of the Interior—has so ostentatiously taken part with the insurgents, that he resigned when the President refused to order Major Anderson to go back to Fort Moultrie, which he had quitted because he could not defend himself in it. Nothing short of the conviction that they had the President and the Cabinet as their tools could have encouraged the Secessionists to the audacious scheme which, it is confidently asserted, they had fully agreed upon. While the Federal troops were kept aloof by the treason of the Ministers, the State troops were to march suddenly on Washington, and possess themselves of all the Government houses and the machinery of central rule, a little before the 4th of March, and were then and there to proclaim Breckenridge President in place of Lincoln, and were to declare the Northern States rebels, if they did not submit to the Union on such terms as the South should dictate. Herein it was taken for granted that all the fifteen Slave States would act together. Wild as this plan now seems, and easily as it has been frustrated, who shall say that if Buchanan had had as much nerve as he has good-will towards slavery, the conspiracy might not have succeeded up to the point of seizing the centre of the administration? Farther success than this seems to us indeed quite impossible. Such an outrage must have forced the whole North

into a systematic war, to which the South is absolutely unequal; and when all the Slave States were on one side, defeat must have definitely terminated the slave system. There seems to be no doubt whatever that the seizure of Washington was intended. Yet this audacious plot was forced to explode prematurely by the decision of one man. Major Anderson, discerning the intention of the Charleston mob to storm his fortress, suddenly withdrew for safety to the insular Fort Sumter, where they had not the means of assailing him. His single move forced Buchanan to declare himself, and precipitated the action of South Carolina.

To predict in detail the course which events are to take is beyond human power, and the interval which must pass before what we write can reach the eye of the reader might deter the most presumptuous from the attempt. It is not the less suitable to point out the general conditions of the problem which is under solution, and the new aspect of parties, as affected by these recent and critical events.

In the last half century, during which the cotton trade and slavery have so rapidly advanced, and the Slave States have learned insolence so unbearable, they have uniformly ridden on the shoulders of their faithful ally, the *democratic party* of the North, without which they would have been helpless. This party has had two favourite ideas—*first*, to raise to its maximum local liberty, and therefore depress to its minimum the domestic power of the Federal or central Government, the power of Congress as well as of the Executive; *next*, to aggrandize and glorify the Union as against all foreign States. Both of these aims were pursued for half a century in general agreement with the slave policy. That the South should be allowed to 'whip its own niggers' agreed with the extreme principle of local sovereignty. So too did the doctrine that each 'territory,' on being accepted into the Union as a new State, should choose for itself whe-

ther to admit or to exclude slavery instead of looking to Congress for the decision. But while the Central Government was to be almost nothing within the States, it was to be of imposing and majestic strength towards the foreigner. The more continental territory it could seize from Mexico the better, even though it involved a spread of slavery. If Cuba could be obtained from Spain by conquest or purchase, this also would please the democratic party equally with the slaveholders. Both were proud that the President should display a powerful naval force, and maintain a spirited tone in Europe or Japan, as befits one who has a nation of thirty millions to back him. In the patriotic vision of the democrats, the great Republic was to be seventy or eighty millions before the century is ended, was to overspread the continent, dominate over Mexico, set Great Britain at defiance, and finally absorb Canada and the other British possessions. For the glory of the great Union, the party were willing to ignore so trifling a consideration as African slavery, and choose for Presidents only such men as had the confidence of the South. But now how is this all changed! Their vision seems to have vanished into thin air. The slave-owners, and not the abolitionists, have proved themselves the wanton destroyers of the Union. The sacrifices made for them have all been in vain. Not only is a critical part of the Union being rent away, but the whole is endangered; for even if there be a compromise, the odious and ruinous principle will have been admitted, that any one State may, for any reasons of its own, legally secede. The first idea of the party—local sovereignty—has been carried out to such an extreme as to swallow up the second—the grand Union. Their Southern allies have not even civilly asked leave to dissolve the confederation, but when defeated in a single vote, have abruptly broken away from their coadjutors as well as from their opponents. In such a state of things it seems to us inevitable

that the democratic party of the North must feel much resentment and indignation against the seceders, and that even if an external temporary reconciliation took place, the slave party could never in the future command the votes of the democrats to the extent which they have done hitherto. To this agrees the fact that New York, in which the democratic party was peculiarly powerful, promptly offered its whole military force to the President in aid against the seceding States.

This is the decisive rupture; but the Fugitive Slave Law, which seemed to be the triumph of slavery, had already begun to undermine the strength of the coalition. Many a zealous Democrat, who went all lengths with the principle of slavery on the slave-area, found it was going too far to claim that free men in the free States should be compelled by the Federal Government to become slave-hunters for the convenience of the South. This was to interfere very disagreeably with his doctrine of local sovereignty; and before long led to a split in the Democratic party, represented by Breckenridge and Douglas: Douglas leading those who thought there was danger of driving too hard, and overthrowing the chariot of Democracy. In the midst of this rose the new party calling itself the Republican; a name which itself has proved a tower of strength. The Germans, who, fleeing from Royal misrule, had always been carried captive by the word Democratic, soon rallied to the Republican standard. The old Whigs had already been broken up, and their ground was fundamentally abandoned. The new party assumed, as its limited but positive aim, to set bounds to the area of slavery, and defensively maintain whatever of freedom was in the Constitution. To so modest an effort no virtuous man could object as extreme. Intelligent men must already have perceived the incipient dissolution of the Democratic party; and we know Seward and all his friends, underrating the violent recklessness of the South, calculated on gradual amelioration

by Constitutional and legal battle, where the other side had no future to propose but terrorism, decay, and ruin.

The Democratic party, by its Southern alliance and its successes, has attracted all the most ambitious politicians to it: we should be sorry to say or think that it has not many sincere and good men. But on the whole it has contained the coarsest and worst elements: those with whom material interests are everything; who desire wealth and power, by means however unscrupulous; those who love tumult and mob-government; those who make a trade of politics. Since the break up of the old Whigs, the least respectable members of their party—the worshippers of money—have, we believe, largely joined the Democrats. To these also belong a large mass of persons who hold mortgages on slaves, and hereby have a direct and urgent interest in maintaining slave property. It is a terrible fact alleged, that the income of even religious ministers very often depends on an investment in slaves. But the Democratic party collectively has never affected any disapproval of the peculiar domestic institution of the South.

The Republican party has for its nucleus those who used to be called the *Free Soilers*, whose policy also it inherits. They are strictly a political body, and must not be confounded with the Abolitionists. They seek ameliorations by constitutional means, and they know that the Constitution itself (whatever may be allowed against those who have repudiated the Union) does not authorize them to interfere in the internal concerns of the Slave States. But they look on slavery as a great political evil, first to the States in which it exists, and next to the whole Union; and they maintain it to be the duty of Federal statesmen to forbid this evil to spread and contaminate the 'territories' (or unsettled districts) in which it does not yet exist. Congress has a right to refuse admission into the Union to pernicious new members. It will not admit a Royalist State, nor a polygamic

State. They find practically that the outrageous temperament which slavery engenders, especially in the new districts, convulses political affairs in Washington. Hence the essential article of their creed is, that Congress shall not admit slavery into any of the 'territories.' They are now quite free to maintain this: for the slave party, by overthrowing the Missouri Compromise (which had been a great victory to them), has overreached itself. It had won a vast area to propagate slavery in: it has repudiated that bargain, in hope of clutching still more. This was the point of controversy, on which it was impossible to agree, unless the Republican party had yielded up that which was the core of their life and coherence.

It is clear that they have been frightened by the enormous results of their own success. If they could have foreseen that by electing Mr. Lincoln they would lose seven States from the Union, and the whole of the Southern coast, they would probably have shrunk from it: hence upon the secession they were far more grieved than indignant, and would have retraced their steps if they could. By the haughtiness and overweening pretensions of the seceders, the Republicans have, it seems, happily been saved from a disgraceful compromise. They have no high-strung attachment to right as right. Like the political parties on this side the Atlantic, they seek for near advantages at moderate sacrifice, and have no idea of martyrdom for great future objects. It is but the weakness incident to masses of men, except when elastic spiritual forces have accumulated under heavy oppression: hence we cannot afford to despise the Republican party for their recent pusillanimity. Nor indeed can we blame them for not displaying a sympathy with the negroes, which, as a party, they do not feel. Their opposition to slavery is not from a philanthropic sentiment towards the blacks, but from a practical sense of its mischief to the Free States. Very many of them, like the Democrats, foster even a physical disgust of all

who are tinged with negro blood ; and though they will not inflict political exclusions on these, would be glad to ship them all off to Africa, and will not endure them on equal terms in society, even when they are well behaved and inoffensive. Such overbearing conduct must be sturdily resisted ; but it does not at all stamp their public policy as insincere or absurd.

A third party, very small in numbers, but energetic and spiritual, often up to the point of fanaticism, is that of the Abolitionists who are not and cannot yet be politicians, nevertheless have communicated the living impulse to the Republicans. They will not take the oath to the Constitution, because it allows slavery, and would disable them from protesting against it : hence they will neither hold office nor vote. They are philanthropists, moralists, religious in their earnestness. They profess sympathy with the negro as a man, as well as offence at the mischiefs inflicted by slavery on the whole Union. They have always avowed that the Union did not deserve to be maintained at the price of recognising slavery ; and for this chiefly they have encountered odium as intemperate fanatics, who would not use legal means to lessen an inevitable evil, but aimed to drive things into a course which would precipitate civil war. It is striking to observe how in this controversy, as in that of England with the West Indies, the view which seemed to be fanatical is relieved of the charge by the wild violence of the opposite party. The breach of the Union, and the probability of civil war, has not been induced by the preaching of the Abolitionists, but by the Constitutional and moderate political acts of the Republicans. The event has shown that success by moderation was impossible. In this matter again has been strikingly displayed the analogy of the slaveholding policy to that of the Austrian despotic faction, in their animosity against moderate men. We probably all remember

the vivid colours in which Lord Palmerston depicted Austrian policy in his celebrated speech of 1849. 'When we advised moderate reforms,' said he, 'they replied, "No ; we do not mean to allow ourselves to be sapped in that way. It is only your moderate reformer that we fear ; for as to the more extreme party, we know their views are impracticable, and have nothing in them to alarm us." Hence they dealt blows of ferocious violence against moderation, nearly as theological disputants are said to do with those who come nearest to them. Just so the South Carolinians, and those who are less extreme, as the planters of Louisiana, have foreseen the certainty that their beloved slavery must be undermined, and must be gradually destroyed, if the enemy is allowed to mount (even on his own lawful soil) a single battery against it ; on merely losing an election they take a step which, in the whole past history of organized nations, has never been taken except as a result of long injustice and unredressed claims ; and that too while the pecuniary interests of the States are so implicated, and the common right to their great river so unites them, that nothing but old precedents and fixed habits could secure them as independent powers from constant quarrel and hostility.

Such are the men with whom a reconciliation is to be sought, and such the elements of the Free States themselves, which have to form a new policy for the North. But this is not the whole entanglement : the still adhering Slave States embarrass the Northern Union by the total opposition of their prejudices and immediate interests. If the whole body of the Slave States had seceded in mass, the policy of the North would have been comparatively easy from within, though the prospect might have been rougher from without. War between two such communities, for many reasons which it is now superfluous to develop, would seem to be in a short time inevitable ; and it could not have been an in-

active or unexasperated struggle. The adherence of all the interior Slave States to the Union, although with grave embarrassment to legislative policy, is of great value in limiting and localizing hostilities. As all the Secessionists are on the sea coast, all are accessible by naval attack,—a form of war which involves the least bloodshed, especially when one side has no navy. At the ports, and on the Mississippi, it is to be hoped, whatever there shall be of war may stop short. The policy of the North can only be shaped by the events, with which the public opinion will move on and will gradually be developed. The more stubborn and tedious the dispute, the more will the interests which bind the North to the South be severed. No new mortgages on slaves will be taken for a long while. 'Slave paper' has sunk already to something ruinous. How far, in case of bankruptcies in the South, such as the taxes and the foreign market are likely to cause, the rights of Northern mortgagees will be cared for, remains to be seen: yet it seems most probable that a year or two will pour much bitterness into the love with which the little capitalists of the free States have cherished the slave system, and a stronger determination will arise to take prospective measures for extinguishing it.

At present, the Northern Union, being still infected by slavery, has lost much, and gained nothing, and has very little cause for satisfaction or self-respect. It cannot forget that Louisiana was bought of France by the money of the whole Federation; that Florida was similarly bought of Spain, and then conquered from the Indians by much bloodshed and by many millions of dollars. The conquest of Texas, as of Florida, by the arms and money of the Union, is in very recent memory; and Texas has now plundered the Federal fortresses. In the face of such facts, the North can neither admit the *right* claimed by the seceders, nor help feeling much indignation. Yet the loss of a definite amount of territory or even of honour, is by

no means the worst calamity which has occurred. The *principle* has been set up, that a State may secede at pleasure, without just offence to the rest. Hence every State still adhering to the Union will be able permanently to wield against it the threat of secession, if thwarted and outvoted in any of its favourite wishes. Moreover, the position itself affords a policy to the Southern confederation of enticing one and another of the Slave States to secede, and kindling in them artificial discontent. By the threat of secession the effort will be made to win new 'territories' for slavery; nor is it easy to see how this can be successfully fought against, unless events so grave infuse a new spirit into the North. And of this we see much hope. Evidently the Union has been corrupted by prosperity too great for its virtue; a measure of adversity will brace it to the exercise of higher qualities, especially as it becomes clear, that to give a swing to the uppermost impulse under the plea of 'manifest destiny' can lead to no gratifying results. We expect that the Union will be absolutely forced in self-defence to refuse to recognise the legitimacy of the secession; else, not only will it put excessive power into the still adhering Slave States (as we have said), but it will irritate Maine and other Northern States to use the new liberty in another way. The report has been announced as positive, that a section of citizens in Maine has petitioned its legislature to move for secession and union with Canada. This may have been a mere threat; but it is likely to become something much more serious, if secession is once made legitimate. England and Canada will then no longer be under any bond of honour not to receive Maine—a district which for geographical reasons would be exceedingly valuable to Canada. This State (whence began the celebrated liquor law, which was opposed chiefly by the Pro-Slavery party) abounds with ardent abolitionists, and is not likely tamely to endure insolence from Missouri or Arkansas. Thus the Central States will

be open to the danger of the Union melting away at the North, if they once legitimate the process which has been so insolently initiated in the South.

Perhaps this is the consideration which has decided Mr. Lincoln's policy. It is the great argument which will impose upon the Free States the necessity of backing him up, whether Virginia and her satellite States like it or not. Of course the Slave States are extremely weakened in Congress by the secessions, which take off half their numbers in the Senate (where lay their great strength) and make them quite helpless in the Lower House. But in fact, they have always been in essential minority, whenever the free States have had a common sentiment; of which the foreign tariff is a remarkable test. The South has always felt itself wronged by the 'protection' of Northern manufactures; yet it has uniformly been outvoted on this question. Much more will the residual Slave States be now outvoted whenever the Free States have consciously a common interest and common right. At present the Democrats must most sorely feel the lessened importance of the Union in the eyes of Europe, and the uncertainty whether it is to have any future at all, should this crisis be mismanaged. The Republicans feel this, and besides, are unwilling to cede the territories for nothing, even if they would have ceded half of them to hinder the secession. That portion of the Free States which, from immersion in private industry, has hitherto allowed the noisy politicians to manage its votes, will be forcibly shaken out of its apathy. They are already rudely awakened by the news of treason, secession, an empty treasury, and possible hostilities. On the 1st of July next, a deficit of twenty million dollars has been announced as certain. To collect the customs at the Southern ports will cost more than it will bring in. To raise money, by loan is simply impossible, if the lender does not know how long his creditor will have form and sub-

stance; hence to declare the Union *indissoluble* is essential to restore credit to the Federal treasury; nor will mere words restore it while secession is a fact. Meanwhile, money must be got by direct taxation in the States. It so happens, that the last harvest of the North was the most splendid in memory; and the newspapers abounded in pleasing suggestions how to utilize this great prosperity. The industrious and unpolitical part of the Free States may now find that all their hard earnings are sacrificed by the misconduct of the South. At the same time, the great Central States, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, will look with alarm and disgust at the mere possibility of British power annexing to itself everything to the north of New York; and thus we infer all must resolve to support Mr. Lincoln's policy of resistance.

Beyond this, we cannot but expect a great and general reaction of feeling in the North towards liberty. The Democrats have found that all their sacrifices for the South have been in vain. They consented to the Missouri Compromise; it was extorted by the South, and it was again overthrown by the South. The South has stormed against Abolitionists and Republicans, as planning to destroy the Union; and by this parrot-cry and the aid of Webster, carried the Fugitive Slave Law; yet now they have themselves gratuitously rent it asunder, and their nominees have plundered the Federal treasury. After these events, it does not seem an over-bold prophecy, that it will be a long while before the arsenals, and treasury, and forts of the Union will again be put under the custody of a President who is elected in the interest of the slave-owners. Moreover, the very prospect takes away from the ambitious statesmen of the North all the motive to prostitute their talents for the votes of the South. No new Webster will contend for Fugitive Slave Laws, merely in hope to be elected President. The Supreme Court itself, we presume, must need to be reconstituted by

Mr. Lincoln, and we shall hear of no more Dred Scott decisions. In short, the total derangement of balance produced by the secession of seven States, must soon produce results too great to be yet disentangled and predicted.

We had written some speculations as to the effect which this inevitable change of current will produce on Virginia, Kentucky, and the rest of the adhering Slave States; but in the midst came in the surprising news, that Congress was rapidly passing a new tariff of most stringent protectionism to Northern manufacturers! Such a phenomenon makes it less and less possible to conjecture how the tangle of affairs will be unravelled. The untimeliness of the measure has filled all England with astonishment. It is a new affront and wrong to the adhering Slave States, and raises a wall against the return of the seceders. Such a move made in the face of accumulated European experience, is a grave warning to us, what pernicious blunders in political economy may yet be perpetrated among ourselves if new democratic influences be allowed too much play. At this moment the Federal treasury is in a crisis of extreme difficulty; but it is a mere beginning of unmanageable disaster, if foreign commerce is to be crippled. The triumph to the seceders will be immense. It gives them an *ex post facto* justification; and may go far to reduce the Northern Union to the same penniless plight in which the Southern Confederacy is involved. If such a law could be permanent, its mischief would be enormous. But when we reflect how small a part of the North is to profit by it—chiefly Massachusetts and Connecticut, some towns in New York and Pennsylvania—while its mischiefs must be immediately felt in all the great agricultural countries, free as well as slave; that it is probably submitted to now in the patriotic hope of filling the Federal Treasury, which (if not much misrepresented) it is likely to empty—we cannot but expect that it will soon be repealed again. America is a land of

rapid decision, and is very capable of reversing legislative measures; but at any rate, the immediate effect of this new tariff can only be felt in division and weakness to the residual Union.

It is wonderful that in the midst of movements so violent, interests so deep, and passions so strong, the personality of Mr. Lincoln can be of great importance; yet it surely is. With the exception of a curious theory in political economy, all of his speeches which have been reported seem to be marked by good sense and moderation. The religious tone of his farewell to his own neighbourhood (Springfield, Illinois), is a new feature in a President; and there is in it a depth and sincerity quite sterling. His problem is to carry with him the whole North, and not to allow the enemy (if there must be some war), to have a powerful faction in the Free States. He probably is not sorry that Mr. Seward and the Republicans were willing to go unreasonable lengths in concession; inasmuch as this has satisfied the Democrats, and more and more puts the seceders in the wrong. But he has (in the midst of soft words to conciliate Kentucky) most pointedly declared, that he adheres to *every* principle which he avowed during the Presidential canvass; and it is notorious, that a main point on which he then declared himself in answer to a challenge, was, the retaining of all the territories for freedom. He has also indicated his opinion of the right policy, which had already been suggested and canvassed—viz., to insist on collecting the customs at the Southern ports, to retain all the fortresses, and to retake those which have been captured; but not to invade the States further than this measure may make necessary. He positively denies the right of secession, 'otherwise,' says he, 'our Union would not be a legitimate marriage, but a temporary passional connexion.' While professing his horror of war, he says the guilt will lie with the other side, if they make it neces-

sary: and he added (with the great applause of his hearers) that 'there are times when it is necessary to put one's foot down firmly.' He declares that a seceding State must forfeit all benefits of the Union until it comes back, and therefore will receive no Federal clearances for their cargoes. In these moderate and simple executive proceedings it is all but impossible for Congress to thwart the President, unless it will solemnly establish the right of secession, and hereby commit deliberate suicide. It is then to be expected that Mr. Lincoln will be able, either with much or with little energy, to adhere to the theory of the course thus indicated, the main principle of which is, a pertinacious resolve not to recognise secession, and not to yield up the fortresses, the territories, or the customs.

The contrast of Mr. Jefferson Davis, President of the Southern Confederacy, is striking. He speaks with the fluent decision of a man who knows that every word is backed up by unanimous zeal; and withal, as though that zeal were armed with inexhaustible resources. He appears to think that bold words will blind Mr. Lincoln and the North to the utter weakness of the New Confederacy. The Southern whites, brave, poor, desperate, and accustomed to weapons, could fight a stubborn and bloody battle; but they are unequal to a campaign, and would be utterly prostrated by the expenses of a war. Mr. Davis talks grandly of the necessity of raising a standing army, besides the militia; adding, that if the North refuse to recognise their just claims, then he must raise an armed navy for the protection of the coasts and commerce. But before he builds ships, he must have more shipyards and docks, and ironworks, and mines, and steam-engines, and cannon-foundries, and numerous establishments, far beyond all that New Orleans can give; and if New Orleans become a warlike arsenal, this

must itself be fortified from attack. Neither capital, nor skill, nor willing labourers abound. The rivers will be roads to the powerful steamers of the North, but are not trustworthy to Mr. Davis's material of war. As to roads on land, even those of Virginia* are unsuited to artillery; Mr. Olmsted's description of everything beyond Virginia is still more deplorable. Bridges have to be made, as well as roads. Then, before any of these things can be done, many millions of dollars must pass through Mr. Davis's treasury, and the proud white paupers must learn to work willingly. But there is no one to pay taxes but the slave-owners. The Southern Confederation has no such resources as the old Union. It cannot collect customs at the ports, for it has no ships of war, and may soon be itself blockaded. It cannot sell lands in the territories, because it can give no valid security of tenure. The whole of the new taxation must fall direct on the land. The taxes which South Carolina had to impose on itself within two months of its secession, reduced the value of slaves by one half, and if continued, will presently ruin the owners. Of the total number of slaveholders in the entire Union, one half had fewer than five slaves. Then to watch the slaves themselves is a new effort. Here it is a fallacy to argue, that because the entire number of slaves in the fifteen States is only one quarter of the free men, therefore the slaves are no source of anxiety and of weakness; for they are not everywhere in this proportion. On the plantations the black race are always in great superiority of numbers; one overseer to fifty slaves (Mr. Olmsted states) is the economical sufficient. It is true, the slaves are not armed, but they cannot be deprived of fire, and therefore must cause constant alarm. The very precautions taken against them—locking them up by night, and doubling the number of

* A friend informs us that to travel forty miles in Virginia in a four-wheeled carriage occupied him from five in the morning to nine at night. He was repeatedly arrested by swamps scarcely passable. This was some years back; but things cannot be better in the seceding States even now.

overseers—suggest to them that Mr. Lincoln was to have done some great thing for them, of which their masters deprive them by seceding. However the masters may pretend that the slaves are faithful and staunch, their own conduct proves that they dare not trust them; and the danger, as well as the expense, incident to this state of things falls entirely on the planting interest, who already have to bear the brunt of taxation. Up to the time of our writing, seven States are announced to have seceded. It may be of interest to consider how their population is composed. For round numbers, let us deal with them in thousands only, and we shall get the following result:—

| | Whites. | Slaves. |
|-----------------------|---------|---------|
| South Carolina . . . | 275 | 385 |
| Georgia | 571 | 439 |
| Florida | 60 | 50 |
| Alabama | 464 | 375 |
| Mississippi | 295 | 310 |
| Louisiana | 325 | 304 |
| Texas | 154 | 58 |

The free coloured men are few in comparison; yet, by their superior knowledge as to roads and general information which is picked up by locomotion, they might furnish leaders in case of a servile insurrection, and therefore sensibly increase the danger of the planters. Their greatest numbers are—9000 in South Carolina, 18,000 in Louisiana. These figures will show that it is impossible for the white seceders to dispense with anxious and harassing vigilance against the possible movements of the slaves, if once they get into war with the North, however languid. Even before or without any active hostilities, they have to meet numerous and severe financial demands. Hitherto the postal service has been borne by Federal funds; that will need to be organized and paid by the seceding State,* which has simultaneously to assume a sovereign position and prepare for war. Blockade of their ports is the most

vigorous measure contemplated from the North: on the land side a mere show of war and preparation to retake the fortresses will succeed very soon in making it impossible to raise taxes adequate to the exigency.

It is highly characteristic of the ruffian stupidity which domineers in the champions of slavery, that they have seceded and taken on themselves the risks of a war, just after the financial weakness of the Slave States had been shown by the elaborate statistics of Mr. Helper's widely circulated work, *The Impending Crisis*. Their remedy was, to attack and beat Mr. Helper; and as if this had given them strength for war, then to plunge into secession. How the planters in South Carolina suffer from taxation and from terror of the white mob, has been attested; how this white mob itself is to gain from the secession, we have to conjecture if we can. It appears that Governor Hammond of that State, in 1858, avowed that only one-sixth part of the 275,000 whites could earn by honest industry such a livelihood as white men there regard to be necessary to their dignity as free men. Very little taxes can be extracted out of such a mass of proud paupers. As their resources cannot be increased and must be lessened during the struggle, the prospect is sufficiently hopeless for the planters, who seem to be driven on by nothing but fear and pride combined. They are said to hold fast to the belief that England, through her desire to get cotton, will not permit the blockade of their ports; the making much of this hope shows how wretched is their weakness. We cannot imagine that any English Ministry would enter into conflict with the Northern States for such an object. For on the one hand, if the cotton is shut in at the secessionist ports, it will still come through some of the Border States and be at last obtained by us; and if it be a little dearer that matters not, when we

* The loss entailed on the Federal treasury by the post office of the Southern States is put down as 832,755 dollars.

P.S.—[President Lincoln now says he will not stop the mails, if they are allowed to go safely.]

shall in every case be forced to import a part of our supply at a dearer rate from India and from other countries. On the other hand, the British Government cannot wish these States to establish their independence, when it would involve much danger of getting into a war with them ourselves on the question of the slave-trade with Africa, which, however prudent may be their present language, the moving spirits among them are bent on reopening. We therefore are very unlikely to quarrel with the Northern blockade,* but shall altogether wish it to be successful.

What has been the effect of Mr. Lincoln's address after he was installed as President, our readers will know before the 1st of April. Unless it induce a great change, we may regard the secession of seven States only, or at most eight with North Carolina, as the final complement of the South. For it is clear that the immediate distresses to South Carolina have frightened the States which had time to learn them. In Arkansas the Federal fortress was actually stormed; yet the deed has been disowned by the State, which now adheres to the Union. Justly may these rude countries, some of them totally without coined money, shudder at the expenses of independence and war. Mississippi already complains that her taxes are doubled, and that loans are needed, but whence, is not said. Already therefore the North has gained some moral advantage in the conflict. Before she puts forth her strength, the South begins to flinch; the front of the North becomes firmer and its claims more precise, and in the same proportion as unity of counsel is attained there, division arises in the rival confederacy, where South Carolina complains that her allies are half-hearted and are scheming for reunion.

Neither side desires a war; neither has at this moment spare funds or ability to borrow. Small collisions may take place on the

Mississippi; but even with a less humane and cautious President than Mr. Lincoln, there seems no possibility just now of a bloody war. He probably knows what we cannot doubt, that if the North does but sustain for another six months a hostile attitude, the monopoly of the cotton market will be irrecoverably lost to the South; and this alone may be a death-blow to slavery. Indeed great numbers of planters are said to have been convinced by Mr. Helper's statistics, that no rhetoric and no quoting of Scripture can hinder their much lauded domestic institution from being financially ruinous. The present crisis, in which Maryland, Virginia and Kentucky are drawn into closer union with the Free States, is auspicious for spreading among them this sound doctrine; and the helplessness which the seceders will soon display, while the North will be manifestly stronger every half year, will teach a lesson of fact to many who cannot learn lessons from books. From a revolution of mind in the more intelligent planters, especially of these friendly States, and from the depreciation of slaves which must be caused, first by this convulsion itself, next by the changes in the cotton market, a new era is likely now to open. How soon the slavery is to be overthrown no one can as yet predict; but we think the future historian will date its decline from December, 1860. Hitherto, the chief value of the events lies in the new sentiments which they infuse into the public opinion of the North. The doctrine of the abolitionists will now begin to find entrance into the minds of statesmen; and the ease with which slavery was abolished in the Spanish colonies proves, that 'where there is a will there is a way.' Nor will the example of Russia and the outcry of Europe be without its influence. On the whole therefore, this domestic quarrel of the States appears full of promise to humanity.

* From the last advices, however, it appears that England will challenge the blockade.