

# MISCELLANIES;

CHIEFLY

ADDRESSES,

ACADEMICAL AND HISTORICAL.

BY

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## A DEFENCE OF CARTHAGE.

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THAT which we call Ancient History, is but a fragment. None but civilized States can have a history: and even civilized States cannot transmit their history to later ages, when their literature perishes. In the basin of the ancient Mediterranean, we reckon among the civilized,—earlier than Greece and Rome,—principally the Egyptian, the Lydian, the Etruscan and the Phœnician races. Of these the oldest and most venerable was Egypt; but the mystery of its hieroglyphics was so cumbrous, that we cannot wonder at the entire loss of its literature. On the contrary, we must look on the loss of Lydo-Etruscan and Phœnician literature as a calamitous accident. The ancient Tyrians had native historians, whose works were known to the Jewish writer JOSEPHUS: Carthage also had native writings: but the Romans neglected all foreign literature except that of Greece, and the Greeks in general despised all foreign languages whatsoever. Thus we have information concerning Tyre and Carthage only through the accounts of their rivals and enemies. We hear something of their works and actions, but we never can listen to their sentiments and judgments; hence they are to us as statues or machines, rather than as men. Yet their deeds testify not only to their greatness, but in some respects also to their wisdom.

Perhaps even the youngest part of my hearers is aware, that nearly all nations of Europe are regarded by modern

scholars as having a deep-seated relation between their languages, which are entitled Indo-European or Indo-Germanic. In this group the ancient Greeks and Italians are both contained; and probably the Lydians and Etruscans. But on the other side the Tyrians and Carthaginians belong to a widely different stock, by German speculators named Shemitic, but among ourselves more recently Syro-Arabian, or, by a still more comprehensive term Hebræo-African. They are an offshoot of the great race which has peopled Babylonia, Assyria, Syria, Arabia, Abyssinia; but are more distantly related to the Egyptians and to the wide-spread nations of ancient Numidia and Mauritania. The Sidonians and Tyrians, whose language was a mere dialect of Hebrew, were the carriers of the ancient world. Like the Hollanders, they were pent up into a narrow territory, and by way of compensation they made the sea their possession. In the earliest times while Egypt possessed no foreign dependencies, the total want of ship timber seems to have disabled her from maritime voyages; so that in the Homeric age the Sidonians were unrivalled as traders. Carthage, a colony of Tyre, like our Australian or American colonies, had many advantages over the mother city. The colonists carried out with them all the experience, knowledge and skill acquired in long ages at home, and settled where land was abundant, and where no vested interests or vested abuses, could embarrass the progress of the young society. But Carthage was not the only nor the first Punic colony on that coast: she was only the most prosperous, and as such, the head of the African confederacy.

Tyre and Carthage, while they existed, were active civilizers of the world, and valuable friends to all who would accept their friendship. Yet they have not been happy enough to attract the sympathies of later times; partly, because their literature has perished, and partly because their art was principally industrial. The skill and enterprize of Carthage in Cyclopiian building is acknowledged by the

Romans : but what we might say of English towns, was true of the Punic structures,—that no material and visible remains could survive their political greatness. Neither elegance of sculpture nor grandeur of temple-architecture, came forth out of Tyre and Carthage to impress the imagination and excite the interest of our modern ages : hence perhaps in some degree a harsher judgment of historians against them. Yet as regards the Syro-Phœnician people in general, if we may not dwell on so isolated a phenomenon as the gigantic temple-architecture of Baalbec, it ought not to be forgotten that the most intellectual of implements had its origin with them. All the Alphabets used by Christians and Mussulmans flow out of the Phœnician fountain. China and Egypt invented symbolic writing, but India, Babylonia and Phœnicia developed true Alphabets. Religion is that which chiefly stimulates grand and beautiful Art, but Commerce appears to be the true mother of prose literature.

The Phœnician cities on both continents, like those of Greece and Italy, were constitutional and free ; governed originally by kings, but with public assemblies and sure laws. There was also this in common in the constitutional history of them all, that the royalty was first weakened and at last vanished ; so that the later stage was a contest of aristocracy and democracy. But the Punic States, alike in Phœnicia and in Africa, equally with the Etruscan cities, in contrast with Greece and Italy, deserve honourable mention for their freedom from domestic wars. The bloody conflicts of Greek against Greek, and of Latin against Latin city, fill many a painful page of our histories. It must have arisen from deep-seated causes that so very opposite a picture meets us in the antagonistic races ; and the mere statement of the fact shows that there was in the Punic populations either more wisdom and justice,—the parent of better organic connection ; or some more powerful cement of their moral union. So much the more do we regret the loss of their literature and history.

The annals of Carthage overlap those of Greece and Rome, by her struggles for the island of Sicily, where the two nations met: indeed the history may be said to fall into three natural periods,—the Etruscan, from B.C. 878 to B.C. 480; the Syracusan, from B.C. 480 to B.C. 264; and the Roman, from B.C. 264 until Carthage was destroyed in B.C. 146. Accordingly, our information concerning this celebrated city is chiefly derived, either from the Sicilian DIODORUS, (who narrates the wars of Carthage against Syracuse,) or from the historians of Rome,—POLYBIUS, LIVY, APPIAN. We have no reason to suppose that any of them, or the authorities whom they followed, had access to Punic literature, understood the Punic tongue, or had seen the Punic people in their own homes, as friends and companions. The picture which they set before us is wholly external, and such as presents itself to an enemy's eye: in fact, it is credible, that a French dramatist draws of the English nation a picture as near to the truth, as a Sikeliot or a Roman drew concerning Carthage.

We must neither wonder, nor hastily believe, when we find current in antiquity vague aspersions against Carthage of *cruelty* and *faithlessness*. LIVY, who receives the doctrine of Punic faithlessness as orthodox and unquestionable, nevertheless furnishes us with facts which show Roman faithlessness in abundance, but nothing similar on the side of Carthage. In the pages of POLYBIUS the superior good faith of Carthage is still more prominent; nor (I believe) can any other result be made out from DIODORUS in the comparison of Carthaginian with Greek. Accordingly, most of the moderns acquit Carthage on this head; and we are perhaps pretty well agreed that "*Punic faith*" was as respectable as that of any historical nation of antiquity. Nevertheless, many of the moderns assail Carthage with great severity on *other* points, and in a manner which seems to me unknown to the ancients in general:—for the cruelties of her religion, the narrowmindedness of her monopolies, her violences to the subject population, her treacheries to her hired armies, her

ferocities in conquest, her rigour and stupid ruthlessness to unsuccessful generals, the silliness of her distribution of patronage and of her whole army-system. Even the fair-minded ARNOLD gives a general assent to these censures, and rejoices that HANNIBAL was conquered. MICHELET, who sees England in Carthage, reviles her with great gust.—I think therefore it is not amiss to spend a little time on a review of the moral position of Carthage in the ancient world. But first, I must dwell on the mere external picture,—as it presented itself in successive eras to Greeks and Romans.

ARISTOTLE saw the Punic power, as a remarkable cluster of United States, rooted first on the coast of Africa, but spreading perpetually into the interior by an admirable system of colonization; which drained off all the poverty of the towns to people the fertile country,—wildernesses where the indigenous barbarians were satisfied with a roaming life. He knew that the forces of the republic pressed hard upon the Greeks of Cyrene. He was aware that the internal constitution of the States, like all highly developed organisms, was complicated and peculiar. To him it appeared to deserve high praise for its balance between aristocracy and democracy. Royalty had already disappeared. The isocratic spirit of Commerce, with its newly risen wealth, as usual, undermined the power of the old noble families. So systematic was colonization, by sea and land, that the coast of Algiers was studded with Punic towns; exploring expeditions sailed to great distances, and some colonies were planted even on the Atlantic coasts of Morocco. How arduous is the undertaking to blend into one community a more civilized with a ruder and foreign people, the English nation is perpetually reminded among the Erse-talking population of Ireland, as well as in the colonies. That the native Africans should not often have felt the Punic rule oppressive, was impossible; and wars against the independent tribes were very frequent: nevertheless, towns and villages of mixed population arose, called by the Greeks *Liby-phœnicians*; and

in the next century these had been so effectually Punized, that no troops in the Carthaginian armies were more faithful. The Punic influence seems to have operated far more efficaciously than that of Egypt for the civilization of Africa, from several reasons combined : 1.—because there was among the Punes (as the Latins called them) no system of caste or scruple of religion, to prevent social intercourse and intermarriage with the Africans ; 2.—because Egypt was surrounded by deserts which for want of water could not be cultivated, while around Carthage in many directions the fertile land was endless ; 3.—because the maritime system of Carthage enabled them to choose numerous points along the coasts for their colonies, wherever the land and the harbours were good. Nor did the influence which Carthage diffused, unman the nations which received it, like the boasted civilization of Rome. Time only was needed, to blend the Africans into a free and willing union with Punic cultivation.

In the days of ARISTOTLE moreover Carthage was not only a great *African* power, but laid claim to the supremacy both of many smaller islands, and even of Sicily and Sardinia. Islands were naturally coveted by her, as uniting value with security. Colonies planted on them could be made safe against the native barbarians, without becoming either strong enough to resist and defy the mother country, or indifferent to connexion with her. At an early period,—we do not exactly know when,—the coast of Sardinia fell under the power of the Punic confederacy, although the interior mountaineers remained independent : Corsica passed into the same hands, perhaps only when the power of Etruria was overthrown. We know more distinctly the eras of the Carthaginian wars against Syracuse, which indeed are a history in themselves, and a very remarkable one. When we look to the position of Carthage, close to the modern Tunis ; when we consider how short was the run across to Sicily,—and how desirable to secure safe retreat from storms at moderate distances in the coasting navigation of the ancients,—we cannot call it cupidit

in the Punic states, to have sought and obtained little islands, promontories and ports in several parts of the coast: and, once obtained, they seemed to the Carthaginians necessities of existence, as now Gibraltar, Malta, and a passage through Egypt appear to an English ministry. It would have been well for Carthage, and for the world, if she had restrained her desires to these, which were on the western end and northern coast of Sicily: but by aspiring to conquer all the coasts, she fell into interminable conflict with the Greeks, the only nation just then a competent antagonist to the Punes. The date of the first great war is B.C. 480, the very year in which XERXES invaded Greece. This coincidence is so remarkable, that DIODORUS among the ancients, and some of the moderns, have believed that the attack was brought about by the policy of XERXES, who used the intrigues of his Phœnician subjects to stir up the Carthaginians to this enterprize. But HERODOTUS tells a simpler and more probable tale. XERXES had no capacity for intrigue, or he could have subdued Greece ten times over.

The same internal factions, which were the curse of Greece, distracted the colonists in Sicily; and the tyrant of Himera called the Carthaginians in, to aid him against the tyrant of Agrigentum. They landed at Panormus, which (though the name is Greek) was their own city; and Selinus is especially named as their ally. We can scarcely doubt that the violent factions among the Greeks tempted the Punes to interfere, and gave them reasonable hopes of success. The forces here and elsewhere ascribed to the Carthaginians are counted by the hundred thousand. The enormous variety of estimate warns us that we must not take them for genuine enumerations: nevertheless the armaments must have been great when a hundred thousand men is the lowest number assigned.\*

\* In the war of B.C. 480 the Punic force is 300,000 infantry according to HERODOTUS and DIODORUS: the latter adds 2,000 ships of war and 3,000 merchantmen. In the war of B.C. 410 DIODORUS tells us that EPHORUS ascribed to HANNIBAL 200,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry; but

The outline of DIODORUS'S story is, that the Carthaginian general's cavalry were all lost in a storm, and his whole army presently destroyed, by his mistaking foes for friends. After this severe blow, the Punic forces for seventy years avoid the Sicilian Greeks, and make no similar attempt, until Segesta, which had entangled Athens in the fatal Syracusan war, plays a similar part with Carthage. Becoming desperate when the Athenian armaments were so miserably destroyed, Segesta formally surrendered herself to the Punes, in order to escape the vengeance of SELINUS : and they were unable to refuse such a bait. By accepting the cession of Segesta, the Punic confederacy became involved in a series of wars against Syracuse which with short cessations lasted from B.C. 410 to B.C. 338, when by the splendid successes of TIMOLEON the Punic territory was limited to an extremely narrow strip of land. The war of AGATHOCLES follows, which is still more deadly to Carthage, who in it was attacked at home. No other great State of antiquity known to us ever endured so dreadful a series of disasters in so short a time, and came out of them unhurt. No historian, as far as I am aware, ancient or modern, has impeached the truth of this history : nor do I distrust it : but the result is, that the Sicilian Greeks, after 90 years of war in which they are always finally victorious, are left exhausted and prostrate ; while Carthage, always repulsed with dreadful loss, grows stronger and stronger, and is all but mistress of the island, when Rome interferes against her.

In the greater part of the Syracusan wars, Carthage fights more by money than by men, for the bulk of her forces are mercenaries. Nevertheless, the losses encountered by them of

TIMÆUS reduces the force to 100,000 infantry. DIODORUS gives him 60 ships of war, 1,500 merchant ships and immense machinery of war. In the war of Motya (DIOD. XIV. 54) IMILCON comes too late, with 300,000 infantry, 4,000 horses, 400 chariots, 400 ships of war, 600 ships of burden,—says EPHORUS. TIMÆUS again reduces the force to 100,000 brought by sea and 30,000 collected in Sicily.

one vast army after another would probably have overthrown the finances of any other State in the ancient world. Besides, in this interval, Carthage suffered two severe pestilences at home, two wars against revolts of the Libyans, and one against Sardinia, stirred up by a belief of her weakness. Moreover AGATHOCLES invaded Carthage itself, by bold good luck escaping their cruisers, and desolated the quiet land, where the beautiful villas of innumerable merchants were surrounded by gardens and orchards and cultivated fields,—all unfortified, and unsuspecting of an enemy. At so terrible a crisis, BOMILCAR one of the Carthaginian generals, who was aiming to make himself tyrant,—thinking to profit by confusion, manœuvred in the enemy's favour, and betrayed his colleague's army. His treason soon came to light; but this only drove him into open fury, with massacre of his own unarmed countrymen. He was quickly overpowered; yet to recover the mischief he had done, in the presence of an active enemy, was difficult. Four years did this merciless conflict continue, stirring up moreover disaffection in the Punic States,—(some of which AGATHOCLES occupied,)—and insurrections among the Libyans: yet, I say, the end of it is, that Carthage comes out apparently stronger, while Syracuse and Sicily decline.

How was this possible? I do not doubt, it was because the Sicilian towns were held by tyrants, of whom AGATHOCLES is a terrible specimen; a man without a heart and without a law,—daring, keen, unrelenting, with wonderful insight of the present, and no foresight or no care for the future. On the contrary, the Carthaginians acted by law and rule, with constitutional forms and legal scruples, which may often have exposed them to momentary disadvantage against an enemy, but secured in the long run the rights and interests of citizens. At the same time, the welfare of Carthage was based entirely on honourable and highly intelligent industry; and since the law assured to all men the fruits of their toil, no amount of pecuniary loss was possible, which the energies of individuals

did not in a few years replace. The atrocities of tyrants emptied the fields of Sicily, and peopled the towns with new and wretched citizens : the Punes suffered no great internal loss of men, and never aggravated in peace the ravages of war. At the same time their manufacturing industry brought unlimited supplies of corn from Sardinia and from other parts, when temporary causes impaired the harvests of Africa ; and their system of custom-duties was profitable to the treasury, without painful pressure on those who paid the tax. In some of these respects Carthage was sufficiently like England, to make Monsieur MICHELET'S spite against her natural.

In the first Punic war the exhaustion of Carthage seems to have been greater than any thing in her Syracusan struggles. The ravages of REGULUS indeed were but for one season, and cannot have equalled those of AGATHOCLES : but it was new to the Carthaginians to be driven off the seas, and the naval superiority temporarily attained by the Romans probably distressed the finances of Carthage more than any thing else. This exhaustion of finance, and the stipendiary demands of Rome on concluding peace, made it simply impossible for the Punes to pay their mercenary armies : hence it entailed a still more horrible, bloody, desolating, implacable war against these fierce barbarians, in the course of which the Romans faithlessly seized on Sardinia. Yet also out of these miseries Carthage arose. Though she had lost Sicily and Sardinia, her influence was widely spread in Numidia, whence she derived a most formidable cavalry ; and by means of the good will which diffused itself from Gades or Cadiz, an old Phœnician colony, HAMILCAR and his son-in-law organized great armies in Spain, and established a Carthaginian leadership over a large part of that warlike land. Neither Rome, nor any city of Greece, shows an elasticity so surprizing. For, within twenty years of the dreadful intestine war which attacked her when already prostrate, she assumes the offensive against Rome, urged not by necessity alone, but with just calculations

of hope,—and she all but conquered. If SCIPIO overcame HANNIBAL, it was not on the field of battle, but by intrigue and smooth speeches. His majestic demeanor, his personal kindnesses, his plausible liberalism, won over the Spaniards and the ablest chief of the Numidians—MASSINISSA, the leader of the Carthaginian cavalry in Spain. These were the arms which subdued HANNIBAL and Carthage.

Looking now at this rude outline of events, we see in the Punic confederation free United States, whose power is based on personal industry and public law,—colonizing a wild continent,—blending the rude natives with itself and with its own arts and freedom,—averse to the profession of arms,—coveting islands and fortresses not for military ambition, but for the extension of commerce,—maintaining armies and warlike fleets only as the guards of its civilization: for, (since their pay was a serious drain on the treasury,) ordinarily, we may presume, the armaments were restricted to that which self-defence required. Land it had enough lying wild; it had no motive in the growth of population for encroachment on agriculturists. To its commerce Good Will was necessary; and to its rapid restoration after disasters, internal Good Government. Even without closer knowledge of details we may pronounce this to be an organization which deserved to live in antiquity; which also would have been a most valuable counterpoise to Rome.

For on the other hand in Rome I see a power which lived by agriculture and by rapine; a power, which, to extend its agriculture, drove out every neighbour people, and then extirpated its own agriculturists to fill its armies. Hitherto, it would seem, the *pastoral* nations have been the most tumultuous and marauding; next to these, the mere *agricultural* populations are warlike and encroaching; but the more a State develops manufacturing industry, the less does she need new territory for the new births, the weaker is her desire to invade her neighbours' land, and the stronger are her interests in general peace. Indeed, it is clear that a nation

in which foreign commerce predominates too much, is apt even to love Peace more than Justice, and to fall into a dangerous weakness. There was enough of this tendency in Carthage for Rome to act upon, if she had wished ; but Rome had no wishes, and no interest, but that of unscrupulous aggression. Every year gave to the new consuls a new army ; and the business of that army was, to conquer for *itself* new farms, and for the *nobility* new revenues. Thus Rome was the type of systematic and ruinous Robbery, Carthage of flourishing Industry : yet historians have convinced themselves, it was for the good of mankind that Rome should conquer, and Carthage be destroyed.

That the political morality of Rome was inferior to that of Carthage comes out strongly in the narrative itself. Carthage was powerful while Rome was weak, and no whisper has reached us from Rome that she abused her superiority. She had a fleet of war, and commanded the seas ; the Romans were long very weak on the sea, and forgot (if they ever knew) how to build large vessels. In this period of two centuries and a half there were three treaties of commerce between Carthage and Rome, which implies more or less of actual dealings, while Carthage was in full maritime dominion. After this long period of amity, the Romans hear that the Carthaginians have been called to aid the Greeks in Sicily against a powerful army of Italian mercenaries which has massacred the peaceful inhabitants of Messana, possessed itself of that critical city, and established itself as a piratical State. In fear lest the help thus given should gain to the Carthaginians the good will of the Greeks, and make them leaders in the island, the Romans declared war upon them. So scandalous a ground of war was new to the Romans, who had just executed atrocious vengeance of an army of their own for the very same crime in the opposite city of Rhegium ; and the Senate was so ashamed of the affair that they would not vote the war. Yet they might have stopped it easily by their overwhelming influence with the people, if they had but pronounced the war impious, as

they felt it to be. Instead of this, they remained silent and allowed the consuls to persuade the people to the war by the base argument that the army would get plenty of spoil. War being decreed by the people, the Senate conducted it at once for the conquest of Sicily, and treated every Sicilian town which did not instantly accept their dominion with the same severity as though it were a rebellious subject,—like Austria towards Venice. The refusal to exchange prisoners with Carthage was so inhuman to the brave Roman captives, that we cannot dwell much on the ferocity which so bitterly followed up a war so wickedly begun. Let it be understood that we have all the facts minutely stated by POLYBIUS, a warm panegyrist of the Romans.

Surely the great thing wanted in antiquity for the conservation of every thing good, was, what we now name, a Balance of Power. Every human force, which is allowed to think itself omnipotent, will infallibly be abused : and such was the force of Rome. It was a principle with the Romans, (as with the English in Kâfir-land and in India,) never to make peace until they could dictate the laws of peace. While this goes on, Justice has little chance. But if MASSINISSA had remained on the side of Carthage, or if the Italians had earnestly aided HANNIBAL, the stubborn Senate of Rome must have yielded. The principle would have been established, once and for ever, against Rome, that Force is not everything, but Right counts for something ; and that in the conscience of nations there was a standard of higher import than the arrogant will of usurping Rome. Would not this have been wholesome to all the after-history of man ?

But I must come to closer quarters against Carthage, to pry into her defects. Defects she had, no doubt, and in plenty ; else she would have been unconquerable ; for justice gives strength to the strong. Her most fatal immorality, as I view it, lay in the nature of her armies, which consisted partly indeed of pure Punic blood, largely of Africans, but still more extensively of hired barbarians,—Spaniards, Sardinians, Italians, Ligurians and Gauls. When men take up arms as a

duty, and especially as a sacred duty for their country, all the evils of war are softened by the very fact; nor are the soldiers necessarily demoralized even by the perpetration of terrific cruelties. On the contrary, *all* hired armies, bound to have no judgment of the right or wrong of the cause in which they fight, are a dreadful machinery for perpetuating into milder and juster times or places the atrocious injustices of the more barbarous: and of such armies, those which consist of foreigners are by far the worst, since the love of gain is with them the single and avowed reason for becoming tools of bloodshed:—there is not even a pretext of patriotism and duty to screen the enormity. But when, besides, these mercenaries are barbarians, far lower in mental and moral culture than the State which employs them,—when they are so ignorant and estranged as not to understand its motives or even its language,—to sympathize with its policy, identify themselves with its glory, rejoice in its grandeur;—when pay and plunder and a speedy return home is consciously the sole object of their bloodshed, without any sense or imagination of right, any ideal to be glorified, or even any pride of discipline and traditionary honour,—an army of such men is only a set of gregarious wild beasts. From beginning to end it was ruinous to Carthage. The power of amassing such forces by money stimulated her to the fatal ambition of conquering Sicily. When she had attained perhaps the very height of her real prosperity, B.C. 410, she took by storm the city of Selinus, but after a resistance so violent and persevering, that the victorious barbarian army was infuriated and entirely unmanageable. Its atrocities against the unhappy population made it afterwards impossible for Carthage to conciliate the Sicilian Greeks. The enmity induced in them was such, that (it may seem) they needed\* to be extirpated, if Sicily was

\* Nevertheless in the course of more than a century the intense cruelties of the Sicilian tyrants must have caused forgetfulness of the massacre of Selinus, and gradually brought about a state of things far more hopeful to Punic dominion.

to become Punic: but Carthage did not understand that, and persevered in her attempts. This probably was her very greatest mistake in policy. If she had devoted the prodigious sums, which she lavished against Sicily, to the deeper basing of her strength in Africa;—if she had opened great military and commercial roads into Numidia,\* and erected suitable fortresses in the interior, (such as she well knew how to build,) in Roman fashion,—being in all other respects neither wiser nor better than she was, she would probably have become so mighty an African power as to despise alike REGULUS and SCIPIO: her native African forces,—excellent heavy-armed troops and always faithful,—would have had nothing to fear from Rome.

Moreover, the dangerous character of these mercenary armies reacted for evil on Carthage in other ways. First, it accustomed her to intense military severity, and forced her to justify any atrocity in her generals, which seemed necessary to repress the troops. MICHELET gloats over a dreadful story told by DIODORUS, how a Carthaginian army mutinied for want of pay,—how the general deceived it into landing on a small island, then sailed away, and left the men to perish. They all died of starvation, and their white bones gave a name to the island. I will not venture to suggest unbelief of the story. It is credible to me, although I do not greatly trust DIODORUS in such a matter. But I may allude to a parallel. In the opening of the first Punic war, as POLYBIUS tells us, king HIERO of Syracuse, a humane and wise man, finding his mercenaries to be rather unmanageable, purposely so posts them that they are cut to pieces by the enemy. This deed is actually praised by POLYBIUS,—himself a mild and thoughtful man,—without any sense of its perfidy and cruelty.

\* North Africa is deficient in navigable rivers; hence the more urgent need of good military roads. Probably it was the indisposition of Carthage to contemplate the sinking of vast sums of money in African roads, which drove their imagination to the sea and to Sicily, where if victorious, they seemed about to reap the fruits of victory with greater ease and security.

We must not exact from the Carthaginians a higher morality than from POLYBIUS. This writer indeed gives a most hideous description, what sort of thing a mutiny in a Carthaginian army was,—when the troops had no language in common, and could not be addressed by the general, and understood nothing but the words “Strike! Fling!” In that dreadful conflict HAMILCAR would gladly have saved the lives of the mutineers, but by no terms could he pacify the frenzied and atrocious creatures. He therefore found nothing left but to kill them by famine and under the feet of his elephants.—Reading all this, we must not wonder either that Wine was totally forbidden in the armies, or that a Carthaginian general was allowed every ferocity against his own troops.

But next, came the new danger, that the general might use the armies against Carthage, since they had no patriotic feeling or civilian’s honour: and inasmuch as on several occasions attempts of this nature were made,—(indeed these armies developed temporarily more than one Punic CÆSAR,) it became necessary to subject the generals themselves to a rigorous tribunal. They were liable to fines, banishment and death by verdict of the Sanhedrim, or great Court of 104, the supreme Justiciary of Carthage,—for treachery and even for cowardice. If some of the tales told were true, the evil would only have been exasperated. A general at the head of 20 or 50 thousand foreigners will not come home quietly to be crucified for nothing, but will get up a revolt first. When I read how our Admiral BYNG was sent out with ill-conditioned ships, and, at the advice of a Council of War, declined to attack a very superior French force, and on his return home was shot by a Court Martial:—when I think, if all English literature were to perish, and this tale were reported by a French admiral, how some future Germanized philosopher of South America would moralize concerning England, and what general deductions he might draw concerning English character and institutions;—I make some allowance as to partial information concerning Carthage. Indeed, when the Carthaginians

are said to crucify a guilty general, it is possible that he was first slain, and then crucified as a disgrace: for in the case of **MAGO**, whose stupidity or cowardice gave up Syracuse to **TIMOLEON**, we read that he slew himself, and was crucified when dead. The number of incompetent generals in Carthage, was very great; which is not wonderful, when promotion in their army was systematically bought;—another curious coincidence with England. How much *we* have suffered from this cause, others may define: but Rome, as well as Carthage lost many a fine army by the influence of favour and of money in military promotion. It is inferred from the notices of **ARISTOTLE** and **POLYBIUS**, that civil offices in general were purchaseable in Carthage. **NIEBUHR** observes, that the Roman habit of exacting enormously expensive shows of the **Ædiles** was virtually a selling of those high offices to which the **Ædileship** was a step. We find no reason to believe that the civil offices in Carthage were ordinarily ill-filled, though in the great wars many abuses and peculations crept in, as happens to all other States.

Although the Punic population of pure blood generally valued their lives too much to become private soldiers, they were eminent for discipline and bravery when real occasion required. In the fatal battle against **TIMOLEON** at the river **Crimêsus**, the native Punic force was intercepted in a disastrous position, and attacked by a hurricane of rain in its face. Its dreadful destruction has led to the preservation of details, all of which denote its perfect armour, elaborate training and high bravery.—In the last sad days of Carthage, when Roman perfidy has first stript her of her arms and of her corn and of the children of her nobility, and then announces that the city must be razed;—no military nation could have behaved more bravely, or resisted longer, than did the town-population of Carthage.

Not only is the punishment of crucifixion regarded as peculiarly Punic, but the practice of torture also is ascribed to them, as in the death of **REGULUS**. Even if no one example

is clearly attested, the general belief pervading DIODORUS and POLYBIUS seems to convince modern historians that the Carthaginians were a cruel people. In this belief I should probably acquiesce, only that opposite facts come out as soon as we get distinct attestation. Let us not forget, that torture of accused persons was practised in England, until the reign of JAMES the First; that the laws of Rome, and of Greece alike, allowed, and sometimes commanded, the torture of innocent slaves: let me add, that the Roman CRASSUS crucified 6,000 prisoners of the army of SPARTACUS along the roadside, and his countrymen thought it a glorious deed. If the tender mercies of Rome were reserved for pure and legitimate Quirites, while the severities of Carthage fell indiscriminately on aristocracy and on populace, there would be in the latter method a wholesome security against misplaced and gratuitous cruelty. At the same time it must be remembered; neither DIODORUS nor even POLYBIUS, nor (as far as we know) their informants, had been present in the Punic Sanhedrim, to hear its sentences or see their execution; on the other hand, the Romans did meet HAMILCAR in Sicily and HANNIBAL in Italy, and knew much indeed very authentic concerning them;—a great deal more than they liked. LIVY says that HANNIBAL was esteemed *avaricious* by his countrymen, (whom he dunned for money to carry on the war,) but *cruel* by the Romans, whom he slaughtered and burned out by tens of thousands. Nevertheless, in the description of his cruelty, there is nowhere any such thing as putting men to torture, crucifying them, or burning captives alive to the Carthaginian god, or any of the ferocities which some would lead us to expect. In short, in comparison with the Romans, HAMILCAR and his son HANNIBAL are courteous, chivalrous and mild. In the war of Sicily HAMILCAR in vain strove by example to induce the Romans to allow burial of the dead: HANNIBAL also, having slain MARCELLUS, buried him honourably: but the Romans, when they have overpowered HASDRUBAL and his army, cut off his head and carry it half the length of Italy, for the barbarous

satisfaction of flinging it over the Punic lines to the insult of HANNIBAL.—After the battle of Cannæ, HANNIBAL, being straitened for money, would gladly have allowed all the Roman prisoners to be redeemed :\* but the Roman senate is so inhuman to its own brave countrymen, who by the general's incompetence are fallen into the enemy's hand, that it refuses to redeem them, expressly because it knows that HANNIBAL wants money, and will necessarily become oppressive to the Italians, if he does not get it. This refusal must have exasperated HANNIBAL to the extreme; yet neither LIVY nor POLYBIUS (both of whom admire the conduct of the senate,) think it worth while to tell us what HANNIBAL did with the captives. We cannot doubt that he put them all to the sword, when it had been proved in the first Punic war that the barbarous senate would not exchange prisoners, and now, that it would not redeem them : thus imposing on HANNIBAL the necessity of either feeding them for no end, or else executing them. If ever there was a time at which Carthage burned prisoners to her gods or otherwise put them to death with torture, this was the fit time. From the day when conciliation became impossible, the great object of HANNIBAL was to destroy and terrify. The Romans had pronounced the war implacable, and the senate had deliberately abandoned the prisoners. If HANNIBAL had crucified or burned them, or even slain them on the altar, I believe we must have heard it from POLYBIUS and LIVY: and

\* LIVY tells us, (22, 57) that HANNIBAL addressed the captives in "a sufficiently mild" speech, saying; that "he has no implacable war against Rome; the contest is for dignity and empire. His fathers had given way to Roman bravery: now in turn, he hopes they will give way to his bravery and good luck. He therefore gives leave to redeem the captives, &c., &c."

ARNOLD (vol. iii. p. 154) ascribes to HANNIBAL, in the text of his history, "acts of the most inhuman cruelty" towards the prisoners, but in his note he confesses that the silence of LIVY and the testimony of POLYBIUS ought to make us slow of belief.—If ARNOLD had lived to edit this volume, perhaps he would have made the Note and the Text change places.

if at such a crisis of exasperation he did nothing of the kind, it is hard indeed to believe that such cruelties were an ordinary Carthaginian practice.

It may here be added, that in the Syracusan wars, according to DIODORUS himself, the palm of cruelty is undoubtedly carried off by the Greeks. The provocation indeed began with the untractable mercenaries of Carthage, during hot blood, at the siege of Selinus; but cruelty was deliberately retaliated with usury by the entire Greek population after the capture of Motya, which was treacherously attacked in profound peace, during a pestilence in Africa. Again, in the war of AGATHOCLES a Punic general named HAMILCAR falls alive into the hands of the Syracusans: and though he had been only a public and honourable enemy, he is given up to the kinsman of the slain and put to death with every refinement of cruelty and insult. This is DIODORUS's own tale (20, 30), and he has nothing similar to tell against the Carthaginians.

It is rather amusing to read modern invectives against the avarice and violence of the Carthaginians for having a Preventive Service on their coast, and forcing all merchandize to pass through their custom-houses. If England alone offended in this way, one might understand the censure as an attempt to pierce us through the sides of Carthage: but neither France, nor Germany, nor Austria, nor Russia, have yet thrown down their custom-houses, and renounced the desire of taxing foreign importation. Such declamations, I confess, make me feel that modern historians are under an evil bias against Carthage, and in other things are likely to depreciate her unduly.

Are we really to forget how modern a development of morality is the doctrine of Free Trade, if indeed it has at all forced its way out of Economy into Morals? In ancient times Piracy was too much dreaded, to allow free intercourse of foreigners; and where this fear declined, still all commerce was regarded as a just monopoly to him who had opened a

market. The commercial States everywhere naturally take the lead in the career of monopoly : and England who established her Navigation Laws, and sought to ruin the trade of Protestant Holland, of Ireland, and of her own colonies, cannot throw the stone at any ancient State for this sin. We have ourselves only recently changed our course ; and the despotic States of Europe, beginning with Spain, and ending with Russia, have always been as anxious for exclusive commerce as their power has permitted. Carthage had nothing isolating and misanthropic in her institutions ; and this is all that we could exact in her justification. Indeed it is probable that her foreign commerce promoted intermarriages even with the cultivated Greeks, her most dangerous rivals ; for HERODOTUS carefully tells us that HAMILCAR, the king or consul of Carthage, who led the great armament against Sicily in B.C. 480, was born of a Syracusan mother.

It is certainly curious, that besides all the other analogies of Carthage to England, the imputation of *perfidy* should lie on both ; "Punic faith" being not a commoner taunt, than "perfidious Albion." The *cause* of this can only be assigned by surmise. Towards small barbarian cities the Punic faith does appear to me to have been very like that of England to Genoa, to Venice, to Parga, to Sicily. Carthage made alliance with many petty towns in Sicily for the convenience of her wars ; and when beaten, made peace without the least provision for their interests. From the Sicilian barbarians, as I suspect, came to Greeks and Romans the imputation of perfidy against her. In fact, great powers which do observe to other great powers scrupulous faith, are seldom as scrupulous towards little ones.

But I must address myself to the *religion* of Carthage, against which the moderns make their chief attack. That the Punic, Syrian, Babylonian religions had originally certain great enormities of practice as well as of theory, cannot be denied. The wild speculations, wilder fears, and fantastic follies of rude men, blending with reverential sentiment,

generate well-meant but monstrous religion. This is disgraceful, only when upheld in later and more refined ages, which ought to outgrow the follies and cruelties of childhood. All these nations in times of public suffering sought to appease the Deity by sacrificing whatever was dearest to the worshipper : especially, for a parent to devote a child was the highest merit. We know that this was an original dogma of the religion. Our sole question here is,—Did it remain a deadly reality, after Carthage had become an accomplished and powerful community ?

The accusation of Carthage, as far as I am aware, rests mainly on three passages of DIODORUS and one of PLINY ; and as PLINY may seem the more unprejudiced witness, I will first quote his words.—Nat. Hist. 36, § 4, 12. “The figure of HERCULES, (says he) standing on the ground, at the entrance of the portico Ad Nationes” [he means, in Rome,] is not set in a temple, “but remains without honour. Before this figure, the Carthaginians every year made sacrifice with a human victim.”—We know by the testimony of LIVY (22, 57), that the Romans, after the battle of Cannæ, buried alive in their forum a *Greek* man and woman, and a *Gaulish* man and woman : he adds, that they were buried in a place “*already before* dyed with human victims, a kind of sacrifice by no means Roman.” When we see to what hideous superstition Rome descended in times of terror, any thing similar is of course credible concerning Carthage. But PLINY does not confine his statement to moments of critical danger ; he says, the Carthaginians sacrificed “every year.” I shall presently state specific reasons for disbelieving him. I now remark only, that the Romans had enough political reasons for degrading the statue of the Punic deity which they had carried in triumph to Rome, nor had they any sympathy with Punic as with Grecian sculptures or rites. The idea might easily grow up in Rome that the absence of all honour to this statue, was, from its association with human victims.

At the same time, as regards the sacred immolation of

prisoners of war, I think the reprobation of it has been too one-sided. The practice seems to me to have been originally the humane device of a priesthood to limit butchery. In the hot blood of battle, a commander will in vain bid his conquering troops to spare life: but if the priests order that the soldiers, instead of slaying, shall reserve men for solemn sacrifice, superstition may win what was denied to discipline and to humanity. Even ferocious soldiers will in cold blood think the public sacrifice of twenty men a pretty good atonement; when, without such interference of the priest, victims would have fallen by hundreds. Nevertheless, by such inventions an immediate humane end is bought at the expense of permanently degrading the character of the Deity; and Truth, when violated, seems in the long run always to avenge herself on us. What was the prevalent theory of Carthage on such matters, no Carthaginian has told us: but the closer we can look into the great HANNIBAL and his contemporaries, the less reason does there seem to prefer either Greeks or Romans to them.

I have already observed, that if ever the Carthaginians had intense provocation to be cruel to prisoners of war, it was when the Roman senate refused to ransom the captives of Cannæ: yet the silence of POLYBIUS and LIVY forbids us to believe that HANNIBAL sullied his victory by any act of cruel superstition. How, in the face of this, can one believe PLINY'S statement, that the Carthaginians *every year* offered a human victim to HERCULES? Such a sacrifice would imply, that they needed no stimulus of terror and revenge. If HAMILCAR, as magistrate of Carthage, in time of peace, ungoaded by danger or passion, could tranquilly slay human beings to the god, as a yearly matter of routine; is it credible, that in the exasperation of resentment and pride of victory HANNIBAL would have been *more* tender to the Romans whom he had subdued in fight,—whom also the Roman senate held so vile,—than his father and grandfather had been to innocent victims at home?

It is often stated, on the authority of THEOPHRASTUS, that after the repulse of the Punic forces from Sicily, B.C. 480, GELO imposed on Carthage the duty of abstaining from human sacrifices. We may almost infer THEOPHRASTUS to have known, that in his day no such sacrifices were practised; and in so far, it is a contradiction to PLINY; especially if their cessation dates from so early a year as B.C. 480. If indeed Punic superstition had been strong, no foreign treaty could have suppressed it; for Carthage was in no sense reduced under GELO's power. What were THEOPHRASTUS's sources of knowledge, I am quite unaware, and therefore cannot discuss the question. But HERODOTUS, in relating the defeat as told by the Carthaginians, says, that HAMILCAR was engaged in offering whole burnt offerings,—(the narrator does not say, *human* victims; which he certainly would have said, if he had meant it.)—and when the general saw his army routed, he threw himself into the fire: for which the Carthaginians celebrated his memory with the highest honours, just as XERXES honoured the satrap BOGES for a similar death.

But I stated, that DIODORUS supports PLINY;—that is, so far as the course of his history is carried down. He does not speak of the latest times of Carthage, but of her conflict with the Greeks of Sicily. During the siege of Agrigentum (B.C. 407) he represents HAMILCAR as sacrificing his own son (xiii. 86). A century later, he states (xx. 14) that the Carthaginians had cheated their god for a long time, by buying foreign children and bringing them up as their own, and at last sacrificing them. This (says he) went on undiscovered, until AGATHOCLES was desolating the land. Then inquiry was made, and the deceit was found out: so they selected 200 children of the principal men of the State, and sacrificed them by public authority: and as many as 300 persons, conscious of guilt, gave themselves up to the flames.

To me it is simply incredible, that such a system of trickery was ever secret: the historian who makes that statement, seems to show his credulity. Also for another reason

I am led to doubt of his main fact. Neither when REGULUS was in Africa, nor when SCIPIO reduced Carthage to still harder straits, nor in the third Punic war, when Roman treachery and overwhelming force were about to consummate their last vengeance;—I say, on none of these occasions do the narrators from the Roman side attribute any of these superstitions to their enemy. Are we to imagine that Carthage had undergone a great religious change in the few years which separated AGATHOCLES from REGULUS? That is hard to believe: but if so it were, it would denote in Carthage an inward power of moral progress unparalleled in antiquity, so as in fact to supersede my vindication. On the other hand, the Sicilian Greeks were possessed with very hostile feelings towards Carthage; and hearing the report, that their religion approved of such sacrifices, might interpret any large fire in the enemy's camp or city to be a celebration of such dreadful rites. Indeed, this very idea is suggested by another strange story in DIODORUS (xx. 65), which is the only remaining head of accusation. After a victory over AGATHOCLES, the Punic general prepares to sacrifice to his god the handsomest captives as a thank-offering: but the ministers are so clumsy with the fire, as to burn down their own camp with dreadful destruction to themselves. DIODORUS moralizes on the judgment of God, which retaliated their impiety on their own head: but we are forced to conclude, that they had very little practice in these fiery offerings, if they were so unhandy in the management.

In this connection I may notice, that, according to QUINTUS CURTIUS, during the siege of Tyre by ALEXANDER the Great "some persons proposed to renew an ancient custom" (such are his words) "of sacrificing to Saturn a boy of free parentage; and unless the elder men, who were at the head of affairs, had opposed, dire superstition would have overcome humanity." Thus we find, that a hundred years before the great HANNIBAL, this cruel rite had been thoroughly disused at Tyre; and when the fanaticism of a few strove to revive it, the men in authority

were its opponents. Carthage, the colony, is not likely to have been more conservative of antiquated superstition than Tyre, the mother city. Tyre had undergone no social revolution; violently to overthrow its old creed. An established church finds it hard to uphold in a colony the traditional authority which it has attained at home: hence on the new soil of Africa and with a more extended intercourse, barbarian superstition must have died out somewhat more rapidly than at Tyre.

Another curious account in DIODOROUS may be here named. When a Libyan insurrection breaks out after a war with DIONYSIUS (xiv. 77) the Carthaginians are affected with superstitious terror; but instead of sacrificing their children, they resolve to worship the Greek goddesses CERES and PROSERPINE! This they take pains to do, by help of Greeks, in the most orthodox Greek fashion. Thus they had no bigoted and immovable attachment to their native ceremonies, but, as early as PHILIP the Great of Macedon, they were open to influences from Greek religion.

One more topic may be briefly touched. The poems of HOMER tell us of a sacrifice of Trojan warriors by the savage revenge of ACHILLES; which the poet abhors: but he gives us no hint that AGAMEMNON sacrificed his daughter, or that such sacrifices were believed acceptable to the gods. Nevertheless in the later poets such enormities are freely imputed to the heroic age, and are as devoutly believed, as by DIODORUS the Carthaginian sacrifices. Does not this show that a greediness of credulity as to such tragic horrors is a human weakness, for which the historian must make allowance.

And now I have done. Let it not be supposed that I am holding up Carthage as superior in religion to Italy or Greece. In public good faith and in political justice I think that she was really superior to Rome and to Athens: but as to religion not one of the three States will bear moral criticism. Our information is too fragmentary for minute comparisons. It suffices to say, that there is nothing in the practical and

public development of the Punic religion to degrade Carthage below the other great historical States of antiquity, or forbid our sympathies with her memory.

Did not my limits force me to close, I might have dwelt on the topic, how rapidly Rome degenerated, after the day when HANNIBAL was overpowered. Altogether, the blindness of the wisest nations in their wars is a striking fact. Wars accepted to maintain sacred right,—when prosperous, add vigour and noble spirit to a nation. Wars of selfishness, if successful, may be fatal by their success, as that of Rome against Carthage: but oftener, they cause lingering struggle, and turn to the advantage of some third party. Thus, the evil conflict of Carthage with Syracuse wasted both powers, confirmed tyranny in Grecian-Sicily and in Italian-Greece, facilitated the overthrow of freedom in Greece proper, and ultimately caused all to become victims of Rome, whose power was in infancy when the strife began.

**END OF "A DEFENCE OF CARTHAGE."**