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November 1855 My dear Nicholson, . . . I should indeed like to have the talk on public affairs which you suggested; but things have moved on since then! Friends of mine dread that the difficulties of French finance will precipitate Louis N. into a base peace. I argue,—it will then be into one so base that the French will not endure it. For the Russians know the French difficulties; and if proposals of peace come first from France, or if they see French action become slacker, they will yield nothing, and make sure of a peace which saves all their territory and reserves all their free action. . . . Only yesterday came the news of Omar Pasha's 5th November victory. Even if it be exaggerated, still the repulse at Kars and this new defeat make it impossible for Russia to make peace now without a humiliation such as L. N. cannot attempt to remove. It may so be that L. N. will be blown up by his finance and by popular discontent; it may also be that his difficulties will lead him to make popular concessions to the spirit of freedom, as is usual when great sacrifices are demanded of a nation; or it may be that he will get through with a struggle, putting French finance on a healthier footing than has ever been yet. But I think, if he stands, he must carry on the war; and the more he feels his dangers, the more vehemently will he resolve to stick at nothing necessary for success, and will bid high to get Sweden to join us, which means to despoil Russia of Finland and Poland. And if he is overthrown all Italy will rise, and after it Hungary, and after it Germany and Poland. . . . It grieves me much that Kossuth has united his name with Ledru Rollin's; and altogether I think Kossuth is so soured by the misconduct of the Western Cabinets as to lose his soundness of judgment and fairness of reasoning. . . . Through 1854 his tone became more demagogic, less dignified, more defiant to authorities. He is now contemptuous to the British nation also, though I think it has throughout displayed precisely the sound instinct which he so often ascribes to nations, and from which he says a statesman must catch his inspiration. Our nation did not know what he knew—that Austria had given just ground of war to Turkey—that Turkey was ready in October, 1853, to ally with Hungary against Austria; nor could it know what were the military facilities for overthrowing Austria, nor whether the stubborn resistance of Louis Napoleon was what forced Aberdeen into his policy. But the nation since the Russian invasion of Hungary has practically felt how dangerous to all foreign liberty is the Russian power, and the absolute necessity of repressing and curtailing it; and this determination of the people has made the war a reality, has given power to that side of the Cabinet which alone was willing to go forward, has displayed itself equally in our lowest distress and our chief triumph, which Kossuth ought to honour. . . . I doubt whether his union with Ledru Rollin is approved by any eminent Hungarian in England. While I regret all this, I yet expect Kossuth to be great again whenever action in Hungary recommences; but he cannot bear inaction well; and, alas! I make no doubt his private resources cannot bear delays. I almost begin to fear that he covets to be driven publicly to America by our Government, as less ignominious than being starved into the same step. I cannot understand . . . how he fails to see that if we weaken Russia we strengthen the chances of liberty, though Aberdeen would not allow his particular policy in 1853-4. We are doing so very much more than he asked of the Americans in 1852 that the tone he assumes is wonderful. And then to scoff as he does, as though we had done nothing in destroying the Russian Black Sea Fleet and overthrowing the whole prestige of their military superiority. To have been beaten by the Turks is still more humiliating. . . . I wonder whether you have any alarm about America. I should have some alarm if Nicaragua and the Mosquito land were the topic of quarrel; for I think the Americans would really fight us as a single nation to hinder us establishing ourselves on American soil south of them. They sufficiently dislike our northern position. . . . Very cordially yours,
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