My dear Martineau,

        Chapman makes me nervous by talking of stereotyping cheaply my book on the Soul, and begs me to add my last corrections to it. In order to meet objections from very opposite quarters, I am disposed to prefix an introductory Section on the "Metaphysics of Morals." No living man is to me so lucid on these subjects as you are. How much I owe to you I do not know; for my habit is to fuse together all that I learn from every quarter. I believe that much which I learned from Aristotle I have only re-learned more clearly from you. But I often am diffident as to my correctness of phraseology, where I have some confidence that I am fundamentally right. I take the liberty of sending for your criticism the new section. It is not so compressed as I wish; but I fear that if I omit all reasons and all illustrations, I shall again be misunderstood. Neither your sister nor Mr. Holyoake appears to me have had the least idea what I held or meant on these matters. The latter now admits he had quite misconceived me. His Anti-theism is wholly built on the doctrine of Necessity; so, I think, is the Atkinson-Martineau view. Holyoake believes his view eminently Moral; and I think that to his mind it will really be a practical refutation of his Anti-theism if he can be shown that it is unfavourable to Morals.

        I do not pretend that Law exists as clearly in the domain of Will as elsewhere. (This is his great objection to me.) Am I going too far in my concession? I do not intend to assert that such a sphere is not one for (even) Divine foreknowledge; but neither am I able to assert that it is. I shall cancel one short section in the book, if I insert this. Forgive haste, and

Believe me ever yours affectionately,    
F. W. Newman